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RADIATION INJURIES AND TIME LIMITATIONS IN 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASESt 
Samuel D. Estep* and Walter R. Allan** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE increasing use of radioactive materials and radiation-pro-ducing devices in industry and elsewhere makes it clear that 
injuries from exposure to radiation must be anticipated. It becomes 
relevant, therefore, to inquire into the extent to which the present 
workmen's compensation statutes will be able to cope with the 
injuries which may arise from the use of this new source of energy. 
Perhaps the many rules relating to the compensability of a 
particular claim can be summed up in a single sentence: an em-
ployee has a compensable claim if he suffers disability or loss of 
earning capacity from an injury or occupational disease which a-
rises out of and in the course of employment. The various aspects 
of this seemingly simple test have fathered much litigation. More-
over, the applicability of the traditional rules to radiation injuries 
and diseases is not clear. These problems have been discussed to 
some extent elsewhere.1 One problem which has not received suffi-
cient attention, however, is that raised under limitation provisions 
found in all compensation acts. Even if a claim meets the required 
tests of compensability, an employee still must act according to the 
requirements of the period of limitations section of the statute. The 
present discussion will focus upon these requirements.2 
The period of limitations sections of workmen's compensation 
statutes generally set up requirements of notice of the injury to 
the employer and of filing a claim for compensation with the work-
men's compensation agency within a certain time. Notice to the 
employer is usually required "as soon as practicable" or within a 
set period of time. Similarly, the claim must be filed with some state 
agency within a defined period of time. The general nature of the 
limitations problems raised by radiation-induced conditions is ap-
parent when their singular character is considered. Dr. G. Failla 
t Acknowledgement is gratefully made to the Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project, 
the Ford Foundation, and the W. '\V. Cook Endowment Fund for financial support of the 
research on which this article is based. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
•• Member of the Michigan Bar.-Ed. 
1 STASON, EsrEP &: PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAw 783-845 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 
ATOMS AND THE LAW], 
2 A less extensive discussion may also be found in ATOMS AND THE LAw 830-45. 
[259] 
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of Columbia University has described the delayed biological effects 
of radiation: 
"It is the latent period which makes the problem of pro-
tection extremely complicated, because the worst effects may 
not appear until twenty-five or thirty years later. To predict 
the dose today that would produce effects, or rather would 
not produce effects, twenty-five years later is quite a prob-
lem .... " 3 
But the peculiar problems raised by radiation-induced condi-
tions cannot really be appreciated without an understanding of the 
operation of present workmen's compensation systems. Each state, 
of course, has its own workmen's compensation act and no two acts 
are exactly alike. Nevertheless, certain general principles pervade 
the field; hence, an examination of these principles, followed by a 
more detailed examination of the various periods of limitations, 
is essential. 
Compensation coverage generally is provided for "accidental 
injury" and "occupational disease." These terms have received 
most intensive consideration with respect to the question of pre-
cisely what conditions may be compensable.4 Theoretically, cover-
age can be separated from limitations periods, but this terminology 
is often carried over into the period of limitations sections of the 
acts and it seems desirable to make a few preliminary remarks about 
the use of these terms. Some jurisdictions require that an "accident" 
be an identifiable event which is unexpected and easily located in 
time. Others require only that the result to the employee be un-
usual. In some states occupational diseases are listed on schedules 
and a particular disease is compensable only if it appears on 
the list. If provision is made for general coverage of occupational 
diseases, inclusion of particular diseases has been left to the agencies 
and to the judiciary. 
The categorization of certain radiation-induced conditions as 
either "accident" or "disease" may create two critical problems. 
First, the categorization itself may be difficult. For example, ex-
posure to radiation may result in the deterioration of bone tissue.15 
In a jurisdiction which requires that there be a sudden event for 
an "accident," such an injury would seem not compensable under 
3 Failla, Biological Effects of Radiation, AEC, TID-388, March 12, 1951, pp. 65-66. 
4 See 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ch. VII (1952) [hereinafter cited as LARsoN]. 
5 Specific injuries which -may result from exposure to radiation are listed in ATOMS 
AND THE LAW 26-35. 
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this category. Whether or not a court would be able or willing to 
classify it as a disease remains to be determined. Often it will not 
fit neatly into either category. Second, in regard to the period of 
limitations, different rules have developed governing the periods 
for "accident" and for "disease." It should be kept in mind that 
these rules, which are discussed below, are applied after the court 
makes its initial decision as to categorization. Hence, the category 
chosen may well determine if the employee has met the period of 
limitations and thus whether or not compensation will be granted. 
A preliminary word is also in order about the requirement, if 
any, that the employee know of his condition before the statute 
will start to run. The courts and commentators are often not en-
tirely clear on this subject, yet it is a critical consideration in cases 
of latent and slow-developing injuries. In many states, statutes have 
been framed requiring varying degrees of employee knowledge.6 
In the absence of such statutory language, the courts seem to have 
formulated three different tests. First, some say that the statute will 
run from the date of the event or events which produced the condi-
tion for which compensation is claimed.7 Under this test, of course, 
there is no requirement of knowledge of any sort. Second, a number 
of courts have spoken of the statute running from the date upon 
which the employee became disabled or could have recovered com-
pensation. 8 Again, no employee knowledge is required, since it is 
entirely conceivable that a latent injury or disease could prevent 
an employee from working without making him aware of the fact 
that the employment induced the condition. Third, many courts 
have stated that the statute will not run until the employee is un-
able to work and is, or reasonably should be, aware of the causal 
relation of his condition to his employment.9 This approach pro-
vides the most complete protection to the employee. 
Unfortunately, many opinions do not make it clear precisely 
what approach the court is taking. Often the courts seem to be fol-
6 See Part II(A)(2)(d) infra. 
7 E.g., Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 159 Pa. Super. 226, 48 A.2d 120 (1946), 
discussed in text accompanying note 17 infra. 
8 E.g., Free v. Associated Indem. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 839, 844-45, 52 S.E.2d 325, 329-30 
(1949); Gagne v. Weintraub's Silk & Fabric Shops, Inc., 80 R.I. 498, 500, 98 A.2d 854, 855 
(1953). 
o E.g., Marsh v. Industrial Comm'n, 217 Cal. 338, 351, 18 P.2d 933, 938 (1933); Burcham 
v. Carbon & Carbide Chems. Corp., 188 Tenn. 592, 603, 221 S.W.2d 888, 892 (1949). A sub-
sidiary, but not unimportant, problem is whether the employee must be aware of the 
relation to a particular employment or only to employment in general. This does not seem 
to have received much consideration. See Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. 
Super. 187, 139 A.2d 436 (1958), discussed in text accompanying note 82 infra. 
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lowing a fourth test by declaring that the statute runs from the date 
upon which an employee has knowledge of his "condition.''10 This 
"test" is ambiguous and actually must be one of the last two men-
tioned. On the one hand, it may require only that an employee 
have knowledge of the fact that he is not able to work. Naturally 
if the employee is not working he will be a'ware of that fact, yet he 
may not be aware of the causal connection to employment. On the 
other hand, it may require that the employee also know that his 
condition is causally related to his employment. If the reference is 
made to knowledge of a "compensable" condition, it would seem 
that an employee must be aware of the causal relation to employ-
ment to know that the condition is compensable. Nonetheless, it 
is possible to interpret this phrase to mean only that the employee 
must be aware of a condition which is in fact compensable, with 
no requirement that he know that it is compensable.11 
Care must be used in determining what degree of knowledge 
a court requires. The context of the statement may be of assistance 
in determining the exact meaning of the words used.12 In any event, 
courts and commentators should be urged to use more precise 
terminology. 
The following discussion of specific limitations problems will 
be seen in better perspective if these two matters of categorization 
and employee knowledge are kept constantly in mind. Three prob-
10 E.g., Wheeler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 328 Mo. 888, 894, 42 S.W.2d 579, 581 (1931); 
Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N.M. 158, 163, 146 P.2d 837, 876 (1944); Roschak 
v. Vulcan Iron Works, 157 Pa. Super. 227, 234-35, 42 A.2d 280, 283 (1945). 
11 E.g., Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Byrd, 215 Miss. 235, 247-48, 60 So. 2d 645, 650-51 
(1952). See 2 LARsoN § 78.42(a), at 263, in which it is stated: "Under the 'injury' type of 
statute, there is now almost complete judicial agreement that the claim period runs from 
the time compensable injury becomes apparent." In 2 LARSON § 78.41, at 260, the state-
ment is made that "the time for notice or claim does not begin to run until the claimant, 
as a reasonable man, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable compensable 
character of his injury or disease." Larson also states that the period will not start "until 
by reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that a compensable in• 
jury has been sustained.'' Id. at 261. 
12 E.g., Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Byrd, supra note 11, at 247-48, 60 So. 2d at 650-51 
(The court refers to "knowledge of compensable disability"; the actual reference date 
employed is that of a letter from a doctor containing the "first information that the nature 
and manner of the work had caused the paralysis.''); Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works, 157 
Pa. Super. 227, 234-35, 42 A.2d 280, 283 (The court states that the statute runs from the 
date upon which "the employee is disabled and definitely knows he is disabled by the 
occupational disease.'' It then cites extensively from a California decision which set up 
the date upon which "by exercise of reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and 
apparent that a compensable injury was sustained in the performance of the duties of an 
employee ..• .''). But see, e.g., Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N.M. 158, 163, 146 
P.2d 873, 876 (1944), in which the court refers to the starting date of the period of limita-
tions as both the date upon which "the disability can be ascertained and the duty to pay 
compensation arises" and as the date upon which "the employee knows, or by due care 
and diligence is presumed to know, that he has an occupational disease.'' 
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lems will be discussed separately: (1) claim filing requirements, for 
both accidental injuries and occupational diseases; (2) over-all cut-
off provisions, and (3) tolling of the statutory period. However, 
these problems have some relationship to each other and cannot be 
analyzed adequately without an appreciation of this interrelation-
ship and of the pervasive character of the problems of categoriza-
tion and employee knowledge. After these concepts have been 
discussed in general terms, their specific applicability to radiation 
injuries will be analyzed and some suggestions will be made about 
what action should be taken by the states to adapt limitations 
provisions to the demands of radiation cases. 
II. EXISTING STATUTORY SYSTEMS 
A. Claim Filing Requirements 
I. Accidental Injuries 
In general. Periods for the filing of claims for injury from acci-
dent run either from the date of the "accident" or of the "injury." 
In cases of latent conditions which develop long after exposure to 
an injurious source, recovery is generally dependent upon which of 
the two provisions is in effect. "Accident" statutes have been given 
narrow interpretations, while those utilizing "injury" have been 
read more broadly. 
The broad interpretation generally given to "injury" is 
illustrated by Hartford Acc. b Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n.18 
In that case the employee had been struck on the lip in 1931 and 
a cyst developed which was removed the following year. In 1933, 
a cancerous growth developed and was removed. The employee 
then filed a claim for disfigurement. The Arizona statute required 
that a claim be filed "within one year after the day upon which 
the injury occurred."14 The court said: 
"We ... hold that the claim must be filed within one year 
after the date of the injury if the injury is of sufficient mag-
nitude to be compensable. But, if it is slight or trivial at the 
time and noncompensable and later develops unexpected re-
sults for which the employee could not have been expected to 
make a claim and receive compensation, then the statute runs, 
not from the date of the accident, but from the date the results 
of the injury become manifest and compensable."115 
18 43 Ariz. 50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934). 
14 The present Arizona statute provides the same period. Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 23-
1061(D) (1956). See also discussion in text accompanying note 123 infra. 
111 43 Ariz. 50, 55-56, 29 P.2d 142, 143-44 (1934). 
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Among the twenty-two states which utilize the date of the "acci-
dent," however, all but one have given the term an interpretation 
which makes recovery for latent conditions seem doubtful.16 The 
Pennsylvania case of Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp.11 illus-
trates this problem. Muriatic acid had splashed in the employee's 
eye while he was working for the employer in 1933, but blindness 
attributable to the acid did not develop until 1938. Regardless of 
the fact that the employee had suffered no compensable condition 
on which to base his claim, the court held that the date of the acci-
dent was in 1933 and that the claim was therefore barred by the 
one-year statute of limitations. The court felt that "the statutory 
limitations in§ 315 [applied] to the cause of action (the splashing 
of the muriatic acid into the left eye), and not to the extent of the 
injury (the loss of sight of that eye)."18 
In framing provisions dating from the time of the "accident," 
legislatures probably had in mind an identifiable event causing an 
identifiable injury which the employee could easily report. But 
two other situations are possible. As in the Lewis case, the employee 
may suffer an "accident" which apparently is not serious but which 
later gives rise to a compensable condition. In such a case, compen-
sation will generally be denied in "accident" jurisdictions if the 
latent condition emerges after expiration of the statutory period, 
which will run from the date of the event which gave rise to the 
condition.19 On the other hand, if the employee does not even know 
that there has been an "accident," it is not clear what approach will 
be taken. The Kentucky court has indicated that compensation 
should be granted in such a case.20 However, it should be noted 
here that the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the "in-
jury" provisions of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act 
narrowly to mean "accidental event," expressly reserved judgment 
on the question of latent conditions arising from an unidentifiable 
event.21 Although the Oklahoma court also interprets the "injury" 
statute narrowly, it did approve holdings in earlier cases which 
16 See 2 LARSON § 78.42. 
17 159 Pa. Super. 226, 48 A.2d 120 (1946). 
18 Id. at 228, 48 A.2d at 122 (parenthetical explanation by the court). 
19 E.g., Central Locomotive 8: Car Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 290 Ill. 436, 125 N.E. 
369 (1919); Fiorella v. Clark, 298 Ky. 817, 184 S.W .2d 208 (1944); Whitted v. Palmer-Bee 
Co., 228 N.C. 447, 46 S.E.2d 109 (1948); Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 159 Pa. Super 
226, 48 A.2d 120 (1946). 
20 Turner Co. v. Morris, 267 Ky. 217, 101 S.W.2d 921 (1937); Crutcher Dental Depot 
v. Miller, 251 Ky. 201, 64 S.W.2d 466 (1933). 
21 Pillsbury v. United Eng'r Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1952). 
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stated that the statute did not run until a compensable condition 
arose from an unidentifiable event.22 
If no identifiable event occurs and the employee is to be barred 
for not filing notice and claim, he is faced with an impossible task 
if the condition remains latent. If a seemingly trivial event occurs 
the situation is not really much different. Even if the employee 
morbidly considered all contingencies, it is doubtful that he could 
file an anticipatory claim and avoid the bar of the statute.23 It has 
been pointed out by a leading commentator that "accident" pro-
visions as interpreted are not true statutes of limitations but more 
like conditions precedent to substantive statutory rights.24 A statute 
of limitations is designed to block "stale" claims. Yet, a claim based 
on a condition which develops after the statute has expired cannot 
be deemed stale. Any argument for cutting off claims for manifested 
injuries must be based on considerations of fairness to the em-
ployer. As the time lapse increases, the possibility of intervening 
cause and the difficulties of proof increase. But the employee, too, 
deserves to be treated fairly and, as pointed out above, a great deal 
of time may elapse between exposure to radiation and the develop-
ment of a compensable condition. 
In any event, Nebraska alone has adopted the view that "acci-
dent" may be read as the time at which the employee suffers the 
compensable condition.25 The legislative trend, for some reason, 
has been to replace the broader "injury" provisions with those re-
ferring to "accident."26 In one state, the change was effected judi-
cially.27 
The Indiana legislature has recognized accidental conditions 
induced by radiation as a special category. The statute provides: 
"The right to compensation ... shall be forever barred un-
less within two years after the occurrence of the accident ... a 
claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with the In-
dustrial Board: Provided, however, That in all cases wherein 
an accident or death results from the exposure to radiation a 
22 Tulsa Hotel v. Spaks, 200 Okla. 636, 198 P.2d 652 (1948), reversing Brown & Root 
v. Dunkelberger, 196 Okla. 116, 162 P.2d 1018 (1945), and approving Bartlett-Collins Co. v. 
Roach, 180 Okla. 521, 71 P.2d 489 (1937) and Swift & Co. v. State Industrial Comm'n, 161 
Okla. 132, 17 P.2d 435 (1932). 
23 There seems to be no authority on the point-probably because it has never been 
attempted. Most statutes refer to filing claims for compensation, and if no compensation is 
due, it seems doubtful that an anticipatory claim could be filed. See 2 LARSON § 78.44. 
24 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COlllP.ENSATION § 2355 (1960) (hereinafter cited as SCHNEIDER]. 
25 E.g., Keenan v. Consumers Pub. Power Dist., 152 Neb. 54, 40 N.W.2d 261 (1949). 
20 California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, and Utah. 
27 Oklahoma. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
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claim for compensation shall be filed with the Industrial Board 
within two years from the date on which the employee had 
knowledge of his injury or by exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have known of the existence of such injury and its 
causal relationship to his employment."28 
This statute, if coupled with similar provisions for diseases 
caused by exposure to radiation, would seem to provide fairly ade-
quate periods for the filing of claims for radiation-induced condi-
tions.29 
Other jurisdictions have special provisions for some latent in-
juries.30 The chief objections to these statutes are (1) failure to 
provide adequate coverage31 and (2) failure to provide an adequate 
period.32 
Massachusetts and Texas have broad provisions allowing excuse 
for late filing on a showing of "good cause." In Massachusetts, a 
failure to discover work connection was deemed "good cause"88 and 
a delay of seven years was held not to prejudice the employer.84 
Coverage of Disease Under "Accidental Injury" Statutes. The 
question of whether or not a disease may be considered an "acci-
dental injury" has been discussed in detail in other works.85 For 
purposes of applying limitations provisions, however, it is impor-
tant to remember that some jurisdictions require that an "acci-
dental injury" be caused by a sudden or traumatic event, while 
others will treat a slowly developing disease as an accidental injury 
in various circumstances. Treatment of diseases under the period 
of limitations section of the statutes seems largely dependent upon 
whether a jurisdiction employs "accident" or "injury" provisions. 
As noted before, under "injury" statutes the general tendency 
has been for courts to interpret the time period as running from the 
date upon which the condition develops. This view has also been 
followed when recovery is permitted for diseases under accidental 
injury provisions. Typically the employee must be able to discern 
28 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1224 (Supp. 1963). 
29 The Indiana statute relating to radiation-induced conditions is of questionable work-
ability. See statute and text discussion at note 97 infra. 
80 See LA. R.Ev • .STAT. § 23:1209 (1950); N.Y. WoRKMEN's CoMP. LAw § 28. These statutes 
are set out and discussed in ATOMS AND THE LAw 835-36. 
31 The New York statute covers only "bone, blood or lung changes or malignancies." 
N.Y. WoRKMEN's CoMP. LA.w § 28. 
82 The Louisiana statute requires filing within two years. 
38 MASS. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 49 (1957). See Wheaton's Case, 310 Mass. 504, 38 N.E.2d 
617 (1941). 
34 Morris Gaffer's Case, 279 Mass. 566, 181 N.E. 763 (1932). 
85 1 LARsoN §§ 39-40; ATOMS AND THE LA.w 786-90. 
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to some degree the nature of his condition,86 although to what ex-
tent realization of "work-connection" is required is not clear.87 
Some interesting problems which are likely to occur under 
"accident" provisions are illustrated in the Alabama decision in 
Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Meacham,88 because Alabama provides 
no coverage for radiation-induced diseases as such.89 The employee 
in this case developed a tubercular condition caused by exposure 
in employment to methyl chloride gas from early March to July 27, 
1928. He did not become aware of the nature of his condition until 
July 25, 1929, and then filed a claim for compensation. The court 
first categorized the employee's condition as an uncompensable oc-
cupational disease. It then proceeded in dictum to declare that any 
"injuries" which the employee might have received before July 25, 
1928, would in any event be barred by the one year statute of lim-
itations. In Alabama, therefore, it would seem that even if a radia-
tion-induced disease could be deemed the result of an accident, 
the statute of limitations would run on each individual exposure 
that the employee may have suffered. If the disease manifested it-
self after the expiration of the statute on all exposures there would, 
of course, be no recovery. And, in the case of disease due to cumula-
tive exposures,40 the employee would face the virtually impossible 
task of proving what portion, if any, of the disease was compensable. 
Such results, with varying degrees of harshness,41 seem likely in 
those jurisdictions in which the statute runs from the date of the 
condition-inducing event. In regard to "gradually developing in-
juries," Professor Larson has suggested that the period should be-
gin to run on the date upon which the "disability manifests itself."42 
Such a result would seem possible in an "accident" jurisdiction 
only if a strict view of accident is abandoned insofar as the statute 
of limitations section of the act is. concerned. Since numerous courts 
have found an "accident" in the culmination or manifestation of 
so See cases cited at 2 LARsoN § 78.41 n.25. 
87 Larson speaks of reasonable recognition of the "nature, seriousness and probable 
compensable character of his injury or diseases." 2 LARsoN § 78.41, at 260. 
88 27 Ala. App. 471, 175 So. 316, cert. denied, 234 Ala. 506, 175 So. 322 (1937). 
89 At the time of this case Alabama provided no coverage for occupational diseases as 
such. Presently, the Alabama act lists only "occupational pneumonoconiosis" as a com-
pensable disease. AI.A. CoDE tit. 26, §§ 313(1)-313(16) (1958). 
40 If a number of exposures were required to cause a single condition, then that condi-
tion might not be compensable. If a number of exposures merely added to the seriousness 
of the condition, then part of that condition might be compensable. 
n Qualification is necessary for those jurisdictions which may find an "accident" in, 
for example, a sudden unexpected exposure to the disease-causing source. See generally 
1 LlRSON §§ 39-40. 
42 1 l.AJtsoN § 39.50. 
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a condition for purposes of coverage,43 there seems no logical reason 
why this interpretation could not be extended to the period of 
limitations usage of the term "accident." 
2. Occupational Disease 
Provisions relating to notice and claim for occupational diseases 
are not as easily categorized as are those pertaining to injury by acci-
dent. Nevertheless, although statutory language varies widely, judi-
cial interpretation has resulted in the development of some fairly 
consistent patterns of coverage. Expressly by statute or by judicial 
decision in a number of states, the statute runs from the date upon 
which the employee became disabled and knew, or should have 
known, the causal relation to his employment. In other states, the 
statute runs from the date of disability, it being not clear whether 
knowledge of causal relation is necessary. Still other states utilize 
the time of last exposure or the date of termination of the employ-
ment in which the employee was exposed. Often the statutes list 
alternative dates on which the statute may start to run. A number 
of states have, in addition to other provisions, an over-all cutoff 
date requiring that the disease emerge or a claim be filed within 
a certain period of time, typically measured from the date of last 
exposure or termination of employment in which the employee 
was exposed. In addition to periods for "ordinary" occupational 
diseases, a number of states in recent years have passed special pro-
visions covering radiation diseases and sometimes other diseases of 
a latent character. 
a. Statute Runs From "Disablement" or "Disability" 
The right to compensation generally arises when the employee 
suffers a disabling condition as defined by the statute.44 With these 
provisions in mind, many legislatures have provided that the period 
of limitations will begin to run when an employee suffers "disa-
ibility,"45 "disablement,"46 or becomes "disabled."47 This eliminates 
the possibility that the statutory period may run while the condi-
tion is still latent, but it leaves open the question of whether or not 
the employee must in fact be aware of the cause of his condition. 
43 See I LARsoN §§ 39-40. 
44 See 2 LARsoN § 57 .00. 
45 Colorado, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. 
46 Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, and Vermont. 
47 Oregon. 
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Most courts which have faced the question say that he must be. 
The Maryland statute provides: 
"If no claim for disability or death from an occupational 
disease be filed with the Workmen's Compensation Commis-
sion within one (1) year from the date of disablement or death, 
as the case may be, the right to compensation for such disease 
shall be forever barred .... "48 
The Maryland court has given this statute a broad reading. In 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter49 an employee quit his job in 1944. 
He had been continually exposed to sand dust and suffered from 
chest pains, cough, sputum, loss of appetite, and slight loss of 
weight. In 194 7 his condition was diagnosed as silicosis and he filed 
claim for compensation. He had been unable to carry on a remuner-
ative occupation since 1945. In upholding the claim, the court said: 
"[L]imitations as to notice to the employer, and as to the 
time of filing the claim, ... started to run in this occupational 
disease case from the time the employee or someone in his 
behalf knew or had reason to believe that he was suffering 
from an occupational disease and that there was a causal con-
nection between his disability and occupation."50 
This case is of particular interest because of the analogy it pro-
vides for radiation cases. The employee quit work because of illness, 
he suffered a number of symptoms of disease, and he was unable to 
work for a long period of time. Yet, the court held that the statute 
did not run until the employee "had reason to believe" that he had 
an occupational disease and that it was related to the employment. 
Apparently the facts present were not sufficient to give the em-
ployee such notice. 
Similar results have been achieved in other jurisdictions which 
utilize the date of the occurrence of a disabling condition to start 
the statute. When faced directly with the problem, most courts 
have adopted a liberal approach to the question of employee knowl-
edge, although the lack of precision of language noted above has 
been present in some opinions.51 The Ohio Supreme Court, how-
ever, has expressed open disagreement with the interpretation that 
the employee must have some degree of knowledge. That court de-
clared in dictum that the question of a claimant's delay in filing a 
48 l\fo. ANN. CODE art. IOI, § 26(a) (1957). 
40 192 Md. 494, 64 A.2d 715 (1948). 
50 Id. at 506, 64 A.2d at 721. 
111 See cases cited notes 11 & 12 supra. 
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claim is "a matter about which this court is not informed nor per-
mitted to concern itself."52 And the Illinois court, in fixing the date 
upon which the period of limitations began to run, defined "dis-
ablement" strictly as "the event of becoming disabled from earn-
ing full wages in the employment which exposed the employee to 
the occupational disease, or from earning wages at other employ-
ment," although the question of employee knowledge was not 
squarely before the court.53 
Three other states have adopted language similar to that refer-
ring to a disabling condition. The Tennessee and Maine statutes 
run from the date of "incapacity"54 and that of Utah from the time 
at which "the cause of action arises."55 The courts of Tennessee and 
Utah have indicated their acceptance of a broad interpretation 
similar to that applied by the Maryland court.56 
In North Carolina, judicial interpretation has brought about 
some variations in the application of the general provisions. The 
statute is similar to that of Maryland, which provides that "the 
right to compensation for occupational disease shall be barred un-
less a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one 
year after death, disability or disablement as the case may be."57 
The North Carolina court has held that this claim provision 
must be read together with that for notice to the employer which 
provides: "The time of notice of an occupational disease shall run 
from the date that the employee has been advised by competent 
medical authority that he has same."58 The court has stated that 
"disablement" in the claim provision is also to be read as the date 
upon which the employee was informed by "a competent medical 
authority" that he has an occupational disease.59 Such a reading 
provides a more definite date upon which to base the filing of the 
claim. It should also be noted that the court has not been inclined 
to second-guess claimants on what amounts to reasonable notice 
from a medical authority of the existence of such disease.60 
52 State ex rel. Raymond v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 233, 235, 42 N.E.2d 992, 
993 (1942). The Ohio Court of Appeals has squarely held this to be the law. State ex rel. 
Willis v. Industrial Comm'n, 105 Ohio App. 187, 152 N.E.2d 440 (1958). 
53 Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 401 Ill. 382, 386, 82 N.E.2d 449, 
450 (1948). 
54 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 31, § 63 (1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1108 (1955). The 
Maine statute provides an alternative based on knowledge. 
55 UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-2-48 (1953). 
56 Whitehead v. Holston Defense Corp., 205 Tenn. 326, 326 S.W.2d 482 (1959); State 
Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 116 Utah 279, 209 P .2d 558 (1949). 
57 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58(c) (1958). 
58 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58(b) (1958). 
59 Duncan v. Carpenter, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410 (1951). 
60 Singleton v. D. T. Vance Mica Co., 235 N.C. 315, 69 S.E.2d 707 (1952). 
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b. Statute Runs From the "Manifestation" of 
Symptoms or Disease 
271 
A few states have provided that the period of limitations will 
begin to run when the disease, or the symptoms thereof, become 
manifest.61 The Connecticut statute provides: 
"No proceedings, for compensation under the provisions 
of this act shall be maintained unless written notice of claim 
for compensation is given within one year ... from the first 
manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease .... 
For the purposes of this section, 'manifestation of a symptom' 
means its manifestation to the employee claiming compensa-
tion, or to some other person standing in such relation to him 
that the knowledge of such person would be imputed to him, 
in such manner as is or ought to be recognized by him as 
symptomatic of the occupational disease for which compensa-
tion is claimed."62 
This is better than having the statute run from the date upon 
which the disabling condition occurs because of the possibility that 
an employee might be disabled yet be unaware of the occupational 
nature of the cause. As has been pointed out, however, no court 
has held directly that "disablement" statutes should be interpreted 
with such literalness. 
The Connecticut court has examined the additional question 
of whether or not the claimant must be aware of the occupational 
source of his disease before the statute starts to run, and it held that 
not only must the employee be aware of the symptom itself, but he 
must also have a reasonable opportunity to know that it is the symp-
tom of a particular occupational disease.68 
A recent Kentucky enactment provides that a claim must be 
filed "within one year after the last injurious exposure to the oc-
cupational hazard or after the employe first experiences a distinct 
manifestation of an occupational disease, ... whichever shall last 
occur."64 This statute has the commendable feature of not cutting 
off an employee's claim after an arbitrary period unless he has some 
degree of knowledge of his condition. On the other hand, ap-
parently the employee who knows both of his condition and its 
connection with employment could continue working and not file 
01 Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas. 
62 Public Act 491, § 16 (1961). This is a re-enactment of the statutory language of 
repealed CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-157, 31-168 (1958). 
os Bremner v. Marc Eidlitz &: Son, Inc., 118 Conn. 666, 174 All. 172 (1934). 
64 KY. REv. STAT. § 342.316 (1960). 
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his claim until exposure ceased, as the exposure would thus be 
"last" to occur. If this is so, it would appear that the Kentucky legis-
lature has gone too far in its reaction to provisions which in some 
cases were unfair to the employee. 
c. Statute Runs From the Date of Diagnosis or Date on Which the 
Employee Was Informed by a Physician That He Had an 
Occupational Disease 
A few states have provided that the statute will run from the 
date of diagnosis of the disease65 or the date upon which the em-
ployee is informed by a physician that he has an occupational 
disease.66 All of these states except Washington provide alternative 
periods.67 
Washington is the only state in which judicial consideration 
has been given to these provisions. The Washington statute pro-
vides that "claims [for occupational disease] to be valid and com-
pensable must be filed within one year following the date claimant 
has notice from a physician of his occupational disease."68 The court 
has held that mere notice to the employee that he suffers from a 
disease is not sufficient; the employee must be informed by the 
physician that his disease is causally related to employment.00 More-
over, the statute will not run until the condition is compensable.70 
These rules may be unduly considerate of the employee if they 
are read to require actual notice of causal relation by a physician. 
It is entirely conceivable, even if not probable, that the doctor 
would not be aware of the employee's occupation and thus would 
be unable to inform the employee _of the causal relation, but the 
employee himself would have sufficient information to be aware 
of the fact that he suffered a work-connected injury. In such a case 
a reasonable standard seems more desirable. 
Although not strictly within this narrow category, two states 
have attempted novel approaches which, because of the use of sim-
ilar terminology, may be examined here. A recent Oklahoma enact-
ment provides: 
65 Virginia. Claim filing requirements were recently removed for cases involving radia-
tion-induced diseases. VA. CODE ANN. § 65-49 (Supp. 1962). 
66 Ohio, Oregon, and Washington. 
67 Ohio (disability), Oregon (disability), Virginia (manifestation of symptom). 
68 WASH. REv. CODE § 51.08.140 (1949). The wording was changed slightly in 1961, but 
not so as to change the meaning on this point. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.28.055 (1961). 
69 Nygaard v. Department of Labor & Indus., 51 Wash. 2d 659, 321 P.2d 257 (1958); 
Williams v. Department of Labor & Indus., 45 Wash. 2d 574, 277 P.2d 338 (1954). 
70 Nygaard v. Department of Labor & Indus., supra note 69. 
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"The right to claim compensation under this Act shall be 
forever barred unless within one (I) year after the injury or 
death, a claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with 
the Commission. . . . Provided . . . with respect to radiation 
disease ... the right to claim compensation under this Act 
shall be forever barred unless a claim is filed within one (I) 
year after the last hazardous exposure or within one (I) year 
after the disease first becomes manifest by a symptom or con-
dition from which one learned in medicine could with rea-
sonable accuracy diagnose this specific disease."71 
Instead of "reasonableness" o:r:i the part of the employee, the 
test employed is that of a reasonable diagnosis by "one learned in 
medicine." An employee may become ill but still reasonably not 
discern the nature of his illness. If he fails to go to a doctor or if 
his doctor negligently fails to diagnose the disease, then the em-
ployee is apparently barred if the claim is filed more than a year 
after "one learned in medicine" could have reasonably diagnosed 
the disease.72 In effect the statute charges the employee with a duty 
to visit a doctor and to be certain that the doctor is not negligent 
in his diagnosis. It is perhaps arguable that an employee ought to 
visit a doctor when he feels ill. It seems less arguable that he ought 
to be required to double-check the doctor's diagnosis. Even the 
first proposition seems less tenable if the "symptom" by which the 
disease becomes "manifest" to "one learned in medicine" is rela-
tively minor. 
Vermont, too, has tried a new approach in utilizing a medical 
person's advice. The Vermont statute requires, in the traditional 
vein, that a claim must be filed "within six months after the date of 
injury."73 However, a 1961 amendment to the act defines the date of 
injury and the date of disablement as: 
" ... the date upon which any physician consulted by the 
employee and who is licensed to practice medicine in Vermont 
shall state in writing, upon a form prepared and provided by 
the commissioner, that in the opinion of such physician the 
employee then has an occupational disease [as defined by the 
act] and is disabled thereby."74 
This provision would seem to remove all doubt as to the date 
71 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 43 (1962). 
72 No cases have been decided by the courts so interpreting this language, but the 
import is fairly clear. 
73 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 656 {1959). 
74 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1004 (Supp. 1961). 
274 MICHIGAN LAW REvrnw· [Vol. 62 
of the injury. Despite an employee's suspicions, or even his knowl-
edge about his condition, the statute will not run until the required 
form is filled out by a physician. Presumably, although the statute 
does not say so, the physician will have to give the form to the em-
ployee in order to start the statute since the employee is required 
to file notice.75 Such a statutory scheme has the attractive feature 
of eliminating a judicial decision as to the employee's capacity to 
work or as to the reasonableness of the determination that he may 
be diseased. There is a possible objection that an employer may be 
prejudiced by the fact that an employee may bring the action at 
any time he pleases since he is presumably free to visit a physician 
or not, as he sees fit. This argument is countered by the fact that 
Vermont also has a requirement that disablement, as above defined, 
result "within two years after the last injurious exposure."76 Such 
cutoff provisions will be examined in detail below, but it can be 
noted in passing that many radiation-induced diseases will not 
become manifest within two years. The new provision requiring 
a medical diagnosis within two years will eliminate coverage of 
many latent conditions and it will put the employee and his physi-
cian in a difficult position when the diagnosis is uncertain. 
d. Statute Runs From the Employee's Knowledge of His 
Condition and Its Connection With His Employment 
Fourteen states presently provide that the statute will not run 
in cases of occupational diseases caused by exposure to radiation 
until the employee is, or reasonably should be, aware of his condi-
tion and its causal relation to his employment.77 Six of these provi-
sions are special statutory exceptions applicable generally to "la-
tent" diseases or specifically to radiation-induced diseases.78 Five of 
the states also provide that the disease must emerge within a certain 
defined time period.79 
The California statute is of the general type applicable to dis-
75 Ibid. 
76 VT. STAT • .ANN. tit. 21, § 1006 (1959). 
77 This total includes states utilizing terminology broader than, but including, "occupa• 
tional disease." The states and their provisions are: Alaska (disability), California (occupa-
tional disease), Delaware (occupational disease), Hawaii (injury or disease), Idaho (occupa• 
tional disease), Iowa (occupational disease), Kentucky (occupational disease), Maine 
(occupational disease), Missouri (occupational disease), Montana (occupational disease), 
New Jersey (occupational disease), New York (pathological changes or malignancies), 
Rhode Island (injury including disease), Wisconsin (injury). 
78 Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island. 
79 Delaware, Iowa, Montana, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. 
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eases in general. It provides that a claim must be filed within one 
year of the "date of injury"80 and that: 
"The date of injury in cases of occupational diseases is that 
date upon which the employee first suffered dis.ability there-
from and either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence should have known, that said disability was caused by 
his present or prior employment."81 
The benefit of such a statute to the employee is obvious. It 
requires first that he be actually disabled and, second, that he 
reasonably know that his employment caused the condition. There 
is no possibility that the statute may run while the disease remains 
latent. 
A problem which has received little consideration, but which 
well may become important with latent injuries and diseases, is 
whether or not the employee must be aware of the fact that a par-
ticular employment or just employment in general caused his con-
dition before the statute starts to run. The California statute does 
not make it clear that between "present and prior employment" 
the employee must know which employment caused the condition. 
Faced with an equally ambiguous statute, the New Jersey Su-
perior Court, in a well-reasoned opinion, answered the question 
in this manner: 
"[T]he statutory references to the employee's knowledge 
'of the nature of his disability and its relationship to his em-
ployment' are to be taken in the first instance as meaning the 
relation of the disability to his employment with the employer 
sought to be held accountable in the particular proceeding 
rather than to his habitual occupation, per se . ... [S]ince our 
concern is with the employee's knowledge that he has a com-
pensable condition, the statute must be interpreted to give 
relevance to the employee's knowledge or state of mind con-
cerning every fact which, as a matter of law, whether in statute 
or decided case, bears upon the legal responsibility of the 
employee to the particular employer being proceeded 
against. "82 
Another statute of this general type is that of Wisconsin, which 
combines the concept of "accident" and "disease" in one statute,83 
reading: 
80 CAL, LAB. CODE ANN. § 5405(a) (1953). 
81 CAL, LAB. CODE ANN, § 5412 (1953), 
82 Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. Super. 187, 200, 139 A.2d 436, 443 
(1958). 
83 WIS. STAT, ANN, § 102.01(2) (1957). 
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"No claim for compensation shall be maintained unless, 
within 30 days after the occurrence of the injury or within 
30 days after the employee knew or ought to have known the 
nature of his disability and its relation to his employment, 
actual notice-was received by the employer ... regardless of 
whether notice was received, if ... no application is filed with 
the commission within 2 years from the date of the injury or 
death, or from the date the employee or his dependent knew 
or ought to have known the nature of his disability and its 
relation to the employment, the right to compensation there-
for shall be barred, except ... if the employer knew or should 
have known, within the 2 year period, that the employee had 
sustained the injury upon which the claim is based."84 
Under this statute an employee is not required to file a claim 
if he has only a "suspicion" of disease,85 but knowledge of "facts 
indicating its likelihood" is sufficient to start the statute.86 Wiscon-
sin also has a provision stating that the right to compensation "shall 
not extend beyond 6 years from the date of injury or death."87 In 
I 961, this provision was altered to provide that " . . . in case of 
injury or death caused by exposure to ionized radiation, the right 
to proceed hereunder shall not extend beyond 25 years from the 
date of injury."88 
The effect of this addition is not entirely clear. In an early case 
of latent injury by accident, the Wisconsin court held that "injury" 
was the manifestation of a compensable disability.80 If this holding 
is followed in the case of a radiation injury or disease, an employee 
would be able to wait twenty-five years from the date of suffering 
a compensable disability, which itself might be twenty-five years 
after the last exposure. This would be more than adequate for all 
cases and now should be modified if so interpreted. The amend-
ment will have its chief effect in cutting off claims filed more than 
twenty-five years from the date of termination of employment, since 
"injury" is also so defined under the statute.00 
The Council of State Governments has suggested a provision 
84 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.12 (1957). 
85 Trustees, Middle River Sanitarium v. Industrial Comm'n, 224 Wis. 536, 272 N.W. 
483 (1937). 
86 Reinhold v. Industrial Comm'n, 253 Wis. 606, 34 N.W.2d 814 (1948). 
87 WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 102.17(4) (1957). 
88 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.17(4) (Supp. 1962). 
so Acme Body Works v. Industrial Comm'n, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756 (1931). 
oo Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.01(2) (1957); see Weissgerber v. Industrial Comm'n, 242 Wis. 
181, 7 N.W .2d 415 (1943). 
1963] RADIATION INJURIES 277 
applicable to all "latent" conditions. This provision has been 
enacted in Rhode Island and reads: 
"The time for filing claims shall not begin to run in cases 
of latent or undiscovered physical or mental impairment due 
to injury including disease until (1) the person claiming 
benefits knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have known, of the existence of such impairment and its 
(causal) relationship to his employment or (2) after disable-
ment, whichever is later, provided, that in any case in which 
indemnity benefits have been paid, the claimant's right to com-
pensation is preserved without time limitation."91 
This provision has the advantage of encompassing all radiation-
induced conditions as well as other conditions of a latent character. 
It is notable that a claim need not be filed until the employee knows 
or should know, both of the existence of the condition and of its 
relation to employment. If the employee is ill and knows the cause 
of his illness, but has not yet suffered a compensable disability, the 
statute will not run until that disability is incurred. 
Eleven states have recently amended their laws to provide 
specifically for radiation-induced conditions.92 The Idaho statute 
provides: 
"Unless written notice of the manifestation of an occupa-
tional disease shall be given by the workman to the employer 
within sixty days after the first manifestation thereof, ... and, 
unless claim for disability or death be given within one year 
after the disability, or death, respectively, all rights to compen-
sation for disability or death, from an occupational disease 
shall be forever barred, provided that when disability or death 
is the result of an exposure to radioactive properties or [sic] 
substances or the source of the ionizing radiation in any occu-
pation involving contact therewith, handling thereof or ex-
posure thereto, written notice may be given any time and 
claim filed within one year after the date upon which the 
employee first suffered incapacity, disability or death from 
such exposure and knew or in the exercise of reasonable dili-
01 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-35-57 (Supp. 1962). 
02 HAWAII REv. LAws § 97-52 (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 72-1228 (Supp. 1961); 
IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2205(e) (Supp. 1963); IowA CODE ANN. § 85A.12 (Supp. 1962); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 44-5al7 (Supp. 1961); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 31, § 70-A (Supp. 1961); N.Y. 
WoRKMEN's CoMr. LAws § 28; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 43 (Supp. 1962); R.I. GEN. LAws 
ANN. §§ 28-34-4, 28-35-57 (Supp. 1962); S.C. CODE § 72-256, as amended, Act 250, Laws of 
1963 (reported in CCH ATOM. ENERGY L. REP. 1f 17449); VA. CODE ANN. § 65-49 (Supp. 
1962). 
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gence should have known that the occupational disease was 
caused by his present or prior employment."93 
Eight statutes covering radiation diseases follow this pattern94 
and would seem to cover adequately most diseases caused by ex-
posure to radiation, although some question might be raised as to 
the justification for giving special treatment to radiation-induced 
conditions. Of course, if "manifestation" and "disability" are read 
to require reasonable knowledge of the condition and its connec-
tion with employment, such a statutory provision is not really neces-
sary except to the degree that a statutory rule is more certain than 
a judicial one. It might also be noted that these statutes follow the 
general trend of requiring only "reasonable" knowledge on the 
part of the employee, although one statute of the general character95 
and two applicable to both latent and radiation diseases96 seem to 
require that the employee have actual knowledge. 
Of the recent amendments pertaining exclusively to radiation 
diseases, that of Indiana departs from the general scheme. Rather 
than having the period run strictly from the date of the employee's 
reasonable knowledge of his condition, the statute provides that: 
"[I]n all cases of occupational disease caused by exposure to 
radiation, no compensation shall be payable unless disable-
ment, as herein defined, occurs within two (2) years from the 
date on which the employee had knowledge of the nature of 
his occupational disease or by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, should have known of the existence of such disease and 
its causal relationship to his employment."97 
This approach seems to be entirely novel. The statute will not 
operate at all until the employee has, or should have, knowledge of 
his condition and its relationship to his employment. Then, it 
requires that disability, as defined, emerge or result within two 
years of that knowledge. The Indiana legislature apparently has 
decided to balance the employee's interest in recovery against the 
employer's difficulty of proof after a two-year period of time from 
sickness to disability. However, it must be noted again that in cases 
93 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1228 (Supp. 1963). 
94 Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, New York, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island. The 
Kansas and Iowa statutes also provide a cutoff date. See Part Il(D) infra. The Virginia stat• 
ute removes any requirement of filing a claim. 
95 .ALASKA COMP. LAws ANN. § 43-3-51 (Supp. 1959). 
96 HAWAII REv. LAws § 97.52 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. WoRKMEN's CoMP. LAw § 28. 
97 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2205(e) (Supp. 1963). Compare with the provisions for accidental 
injury set out in text accompanying note 28 supra. 
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of latent radiation diseases, actual disability may not develop until 
long after the employee actually acquires knowledge that he suffers 
from a work-connected radiation-induced condition. A case of 
chronic leukemia could raise this problem. 
B. Over-all Cutoff Provisions-Statutes Requiring the Emergence 
of the Condition Within a Certain Period of Time, 
Regardless of Filing 
Twenty-four states have provisions which set up an arbitrary 
period within which a claim for an occupational disease such as 
could arise from exposure to radiation must be filed, or within 
which the compensable condition must occur. These periods gen-
erally are dated either from the termination of employment in 
which the exposure occurred or from the last exposure itself. In 
effect, under this statutory scheme the disease must emerge within 
the given period of time and, except in one state which has only 
this provision,98 the employee also must file his claim within a 
period which will be one of those examined above. Therefore, in 
spite of proper filing, no claim for compensation can ever be enter-
tained if the disease does not emerge (as defined by statute) within 
the given period. 
The Delaware statute provides: 
"All claims for compensation for compensable occupa-
tional disease shall be forever barred unless a petition is filed 
... within one year after ... the employee first acquired such 
knowledge that the disability was or could have been caused 
by or had resulted from his employment, provided, however, 
that all claims must be filed within .5 years after the date on 
which the employee ceased to be exposed in the course of em-
ployment with the employer to such occupational disease."99 
If the condition does not develop within that five-year period, the 
employee has no cause of action. An objection may be voiced to this 
type of provision similar to that which was raised against a strict 
interpretation of "accident" provisions; this requirement may bar 
claims before they accrue. In view of the amount of time it may 
take a radiation-induced condition to develop, such cutoff provi-
sions may be manifestly unfair. However, the cutoff provisions are 
somewhat different from those for filing claims. They represent a 
legislative judgment that after a certain length of time, all claims 
98 West Virginia. 
90 DEL, CODE ANN, tit. 19, § 236l(c) (Supp. 1961). 
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will be irrebuttably presumed not to be associated with employ-
ment. It is an attempt to provide the employer with some certainty 
that an employee will not be able to pursue a claim against him for 
an indefinite period. Such attempts at certainty express a valid 
purpose. Even accepting the validity of this purpose, a number of 
statutes presently provide unreasonably short cutoff periods. There-
fore, it is not surprising that a number of states with such provisions 
have altered them insofar as radiation-induced conditions are con-
cerned. 
Colorado, Texas, and Virginia have eliminated cutoff provi-
sions completely for radiation diseases. The Colorado statute now 
runs from the date of "disability."100 The Virginia statute, with 
questionable wisdom, removes all requirements heretofore applic-
able to the filing of claims.101 The Texas statute, although it ap-
parently attempted to impose some sort of period, seems entirely 
inadequate to do so.102 Among states using the date of the last ex-
posure, Iowa has extended her period from one to two years, 103 
Illinois from one to five years, 104 Oregon from three to seven 
years, 105 and Ohio from two to eight years.106 Of states using the date 
of termination of employment in which exposure was suffered, 
Kansas has extended the period from one to three years, 101 and 
Wisconsin from six to twenty-five years.108 
The recently enacted Nevada statute raises some new problems. 
That statute provides: 
"An occupational disease defined in this chapter shall be 
deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment ... 
only when the disease was contracted within 12 months pre-
100 Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-18-11 (Supp. 1961). 
101 VA. CODE ANN. § 65-49 (Supp. 1962). 
102 TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 25 (1962 Supp.). It must be acknowledged 
that a court may come up with a different construction. The judgment given, however, 
seems inescapable from the language of the statute. On first reading, the statute seems to 
be stating a requirement that either "death or incapacity result within ••• one (1) year" 
of the following prescribed date. The date given, however, is that upon which "the 
employee first suffered incapacity therefrom and either knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known, that said disease was caused by his present or 
prior employment." The legislature obviously intended to introduce a reasonable knowl-
edge requirement-but its attempt left a provision which, if strictly read, is impossible to 
apply. 
103 IowA CoDE ANN. § 85A.12 (Supp. 1962). 
104 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 172.36(f) (Supp. 1962). 
105 ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.807 (1961). 
106 OHIO REv. CODE § 4123.68 (Anderson Supp. 1962). 
101 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5al7 (Supp. 1959). But it seems that disablement is 
still required one year from the last exposure. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5a01 (Supp. 1961). 
10s Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.17(4) (Supp. 1962). 
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vious to the date of disablement, except in cases of disability 
resulting from radium poisoning or exposure to radioactive 
properties or [sic] substances, or to roentgen rays (X-rays) or 
ionizing radiation, in which cases the poisoning or illness 
resulting in disability must have been contracted in the state 
of Nevada within 4 years prior to the date on which such dis-
ability occurred, while the claimant was covered by the provi-
sions of this chapter and not while the claimant was an em-
ployee of the ... United States or any of its contractors or 
subcontractors. ''109 
The statute uses traditional concepts of disability and cutoff. 
However, the concept of the date upon which a disease was "con-
tracted" is one which Nevada, Louisiana,11° and Minnesota111 alone 
use and only in Minnesota apparently has it received judicial con-
sideration. The supreme court of that state has declared that the 
date of "contraction" is the date upon which there is the first 
manifestation of the disease which disables bodily functions to the 
extent that the employee can no longer substantially perform his 
work.112 This approach obviously reads a great deal into the statute 
in order to achieve some clarity. Yet, the court's interpretation is 
unsatisfactory, as it leaves the vital question of employee knowl-
edge unanswered.113 
Whether or not the Nevada court will adopt the Minnesota 
court's approach to the localization of the date of "contraction" 
remains to be seen. The statutory phrase itself seems inept since 
localization is a prerequisite. It is often difficult, if not impossible, 
to localize the time at which a disease was "contracted," particularly 
so in the case of a disease such as some of those induced by radiation. 
100 NEV. REv. STAT. § 617.440 (1961). 
110 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1031.l(D) (Supp. 1962) reads: "All claims for disablement 
arising from an occupational disease are forever barred unless the employee files a claim ... 
within four months of the date of his contraction of the disease or within four months 
of the date that the disease first manifested itself." 
111 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.66 (Supp. 1962). See also S.C. CODE § 72-256 (1952), which 
employs similar language but is essentially different from the above provisions in that it 
requires "contraction" within one year after exposure. Thus, the date of "contraction" 
would seem to refer to the date upon which the disease emerged or, in the generally used 
language, became "manifest," rather than when it was acquired. 
112 Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 221, 103 N.W.2d 397 (1960); Kellerman 
v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, I N.W.2d 378 (1941). 
113 The court may have recognized this problem in Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 
supra note 13, at 225, 103 N.W.2d 397 at 400, in which it stated: "The difficulty in applying 
this rule arises with respect to the degree of interference with bodily functions necessary 
before it can be said that the disease is contracted." It found, on the facts of the case, 
that the claim was timely when the employee became unable to perform "substantially 
all the functions he had done prior thereto." Needless to say, this leaves the knowledge 
question an open one. 
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In such cases the total exposure may be received over a long period 
of time and, in addition, the condition may not manifest itself until 
long after the last exposure. These facts make the date of "contrac-
tion" most uncertain. 
Even if the date of contraction can be localized, the statute re-
quires that disability result within four years from that date. The 
possible insufficiency of this period has been discussed adequately 
above. Although essentially a problem of coverage, it should be 
noted also that the requirement that contraction occur in Nevada 
and while not working for the federal government may create prob-
lems for the claimant who may have been exposed to different 
sources of radiation in various states. He would face a difficult and 
often impossible task if required to prove under which exposure or 
exposures he "contracted" the disease. 
C. Tolling the Statute 
Various statutory provisions are made for tolling or suspend-
ing the notice and claim provisions. The notice provisions may be 
tolled in a number of states if the employer has actual knowledge 
of the injury or is not prejudiced by failure of notice.114 Claim 
requirements may be lifted for a number of statutory reasons, such 
as "good cause," payment of compensation by the employer, minor-
ity, and incompetency.115 These provisions vary widely and, aside 
from those relating to good cause which are discussed above,116 
generally do not raise any problems peculiar to radiation cases. 
One provision which exists in a few jurisdictions may be of 
interest in this area. Some statutes toll the claim provisions in the 
absence of a report by an employer who has notice of the employee's 
injury.117 The Michigan provision reads: 
"[I]n all cases in which the employer has been given notice 
or knowledge of happening of said accident, within 3 months 
after the happening of same, and fails, neglects, or refuses to 
report said injury to the compensation commission as required 
by these provisions of this act, the statute of limitations shall 
not run against the claim of an injured employee ... until a 
report of said injury shall have been filed with the compensa-
tion commission."118 
114 See 2 LARsoN § 78.30. 
115 See 2 LARSON § 78.45. 
116 See discussion in text accompanying notes 33 &: 34 supra. 
117 See SCHNEIDER § 2370. 
118 MICH. STAT • .ANN. § 17.165 (1960). 
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Under this provision a question can be raised as to what con-
stitutes "happening of the injury." The Michigan court has pro-
vided some guides here. If the employer has actual notice of the 
"fact and occurrence" of injury, he must file his report.119 However, 
under these provisions, if the injury is of a latent character, the em-
ployer is not deemed to have notice until such injury becomes mani-
fest and he is aware of the manifestation.120 Hence, it would seem 
that if an employee were irradiated and the employer knew of the 
event, this alone would not prevent the statute from running. The 
employer also would have to know that the employee suffered a 
compensable disability because of the exposure. 
It seems desirable to allow discretion in the courts and commis-
sions to provide relief in cases in which a claimant justifiably does 
not or is not able to file notice or claim. In general, however, the 
periods of limitations ought to be framed in such fashion as to 
avoid the necessity of looking for an excuse for failure to file. The 
tolling provisions may be used to avoid the strictures of the stat-
utory period,121 but such avoidance ought not to be necessary. 
Ill. RADIATION-INDUCED CONDITIONS AND THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
A. Categorization 
The problem of categorizing a particular condition as an "acci-
dental injury" or as an "occupational disease" is one which arises 
in various contexts in the workmen's compensation field. If a con-
dition does not fit either category it will not be compensable in 
most states. Once it is categorized, the categorization given may 
dictate the result. This situation is easily illustrated by considering 
the principles laid out in the sections above as applied to a hypo-
thetical case. 
An employee could contract leukemia from prolonged exposure 
to radioactive sources but the condition usually would not become 
manifest until four to eight years after exposure, which may be 
after the employee ceases to work for the employer whose radiation 
source exposed the worker. The period could be as high as fifteen 
years. The statutory provisions of two states demonstrate the di£-· 
ferent determinations which might result because of categoriza-
tion. In Arizona, if leukemia is treated as a disease, this hypothetical 
119 Dewitt v. Grand Rapids Fuel Co., 346 Mich. 209, 77 N.W .2d 759 (1956). 
120 Paridee v. Great A &: P Tea Co., 278 Mich. 191, 270 N.W. 263 (1936). 
121 See cases cited in notes 33 &: 34 supra. 
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case would probably be deemed uncompensable because disability 
did not occur, as required by the statute, within 120 days of the 
last day of employment.122 If, on the other hand, it can be treated 
as an accidental injury, the condition would seem compensable 
under the statute which provides that a claim is to be filed within 
one year of the date of the "injury."123 
If the same situation arose in California, the opposite result 
would flow from the same categorizations. If the condition is 
deemed an accidental injury, the claim would be barred by the 
requirement that it be filed within one year of the date of the 
"accident."124 If leukemia is classified as a disease, however, the 
employee need not file, until he suffers a "disability" and knows 
or reasonably should know of the causal relation to employment.125 
The artificiality of these results is apparent. The "accidental 
injury"-"occupational disease" dichotomy is itself the product of 
historical development, not necessity.126 In general, legislative in-
tent has been to broaden coverage of occupation-induced conditions 
by the addition of the occupational disease concept. However, this 
addition left some holes in coverage and, moreover, raised the ques-
tion about which section of the act is applicable in a particular in-
stance. In apparent recognition of this difficulty, some states have 
attempted to deal with both accident and disease under the broad 
heading of "injury."127 Generically, "injury" certainly is broad 
enough to include all forms of bodily hurt.128 Nonetheless, "injury" 
is widely associated with the term "accidental" and some courts 
have not been able to resist reading this into the statute, 128 even 
after a legislature has carefully excised it.130 
122 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1107(2) (1956). 
12s ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-106l(D) (1956). See English v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 
Ariz. 86, 237 P.2d 815 (1951); Hartford Acc. 8: lndem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 43 Ariz. 
50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934), discussed in text accompanying note 13 supra. 
124 CAL. LAB. CoDE ANN.§ 5411 (1953). See Johnson v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 157 Cal. 
App. 2d 838, 321 P .2d 856 (1958) (statute runs despite employee's reasonable ignorance of 
his condition). 
125 CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 5412 (1953). 
126 See l LARsoN § 40.60. 
127 E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.01(2), 102.12 (1957) discussed in text accompanying notes 
83 8: 84 supra. 
128 "[I]njury ... is the general term for hurt of any sort, whether suffered by a 
person •.. or a thing." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957). 
129 Middleton v. Texas Power 8: Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916). The 
holding of this case is qualified in Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Mincey, 255 S.W.2d 262 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953). Martin v. State Compensation Comm'r, 107 W. Va. 583, 149 S.E. 
824 (1929); In re Scrogham, 52 Wyo. 232, 73 P.2d 300 (1937). The statutes of these states 
make reference to "accidental injury." The statute of Ohio makes no such references; 
nevertheless, "accident" was read into the coverage provisions. Malone v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266 (1942). 
1so The Michigan legislature reduced the number of references to "accident" from 
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The goal to be achieved is a statute which covers all disabling 
and compensable conditions resulting from employment condi-
tions, whether associated with accident, disease, or otherwise. Be-
cause of the limitations of language, it is improbable that usage 
of terms associated with old concepts can be escaped entirely. 
Nevertheless, it does seem possible and desirable to define such 
terms so that no court can escape their meaning.131 
B. Time Limitations 
I. Claim Filing 
The claim filing provisions embody two different requirements: 
(1) the date from which the period runs and (2) the length of the 
period. The length of the period chosen is obviously the secondary 
consideration because a fair length depends largely upon the start-
ing date. It is clear from the above review that, despite a widely 
varying statutory pattern, most courts, whenever possible, have 
interpreted statutory provisions as requiring reasonable knowledge 
on the part of employees. In most instances in which this has not 
been done, the reason has been that the legislature provided care-
fully drafted language which made such a reading virtually im-
possible. It is to be noted that the only statutory language which has 
not been subject to this interpretation has been that which sub-
stitutes, in some manner, a medical person's actions for those of 
the employee.132 There is authority to read all other types of stat-
utory provisions as requiring that the employee have reasonable 
knowledge. 
In any event, the reasonable knowledge provision seems the 
fairest one to utilize. The statute is designed to provide a period in 
which the employee must file his claim and he should not be 
required to file such a claim when he does not or cannot reasonably 
know of his right to compensation. Such a requirement is patently 
unreasonable. There may well be reasons for providing some final 
date beyond which no claims may be filed, 133 but such a provision 
should be independent of that limiting the filing of claims. It might 
be possible to incorporate other standards as alternatives, but the 
fifty-four to five. The court held nevertheless that "injury" meant "accidental injury." 
Arnold v. Ogle Constr. Co., 333 Mich. 652, 53 N.W.2d 655 (1952). The holding of this case 
has been questioned in later opinions. See, e.g., Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635, 656, 
83 N.W.2d 603, 610 (1957). 
131 E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.01(2) (1957). "[I]njury is mental or physical harm to 
an employee caused by accident or disease .•.. " 
132 See Part II(C) supra. 
133 See discussion in text accompanying notes 137-45 infra. 
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requirement that the statute run only when the employee knows, 
or should know, of his condition and its relation to employment 
seems fairest over-all. This means that the statute ought not to run 
until the employee is aware (1) that he suffers from a compensable 
condition and (2) that the compensable condition is related to a 
particular employment. 
In considering radiation-induced conditions, a different date for 
filing claims may also be advanced, i.e., the date of actual notice 
of exposure to a potentially disabling source. If such a provision 
were adopted, however, one situation would not need to be in-
cluded. Under some coverage provisions in workmen's compensa-
tion statutes, exposure alone may give rise to a compensable con-
dition. For example, exposure to a certain dosage of radiation may 
entitle the employee to receive retraining for an occupation which 
does not involve risk of further exposure.134 It would not be neces-
sary that any physical manifestation result from the exposure. 
Therefore, a provision requiring filing of a claim upon actual 
notice of exposure would not be necessary for this type of condition. 
If an exposure is sufficient to create a right to retraining, a com-
pensable condition exists and actual notice of exposure would be 
equivalent to reasonably prudent knowledge of a compensable con-
dition. For delayed effects of known exposures, however, it would 
be possible to require an immediate filing of notice of exposure 
even though it will not be possible to determine for perhaps many 
years whether or not a compensable condition actually will arise. 
Such a filing upon the date of actual notice of exposure rather 
than the date of manifestation of the compensable condition would 
make it possible to establish a record of exposures and potential 
claimants as well as facilitate proof of exposure amounts. Both these 
purposes might seem to provide sufficient reason for requiring such 
advance claim filing. However, effectiveness of such a provision in 
large part would depend upon other provisions of the statute which 
must be considered at this point. 
To assure an accurate record of potential claims, the employee 
must have some effective incentive, either positive or negative, to 
file his claim. On the negative side, the statute could be framed to 
bar all claims for injuries developing from any exposure of which 
the employee had notice. For example: 
"A claim for compensation must be filed within one year 
of the date upon which the employee knew, or in the exercise 
134 See ATOMS AND THE LAw 829-30. 
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of reasonable diligence should have known, of the existence of 
a compensable condition and its relation to employment. Pro-
vided: if the employee has actual notice of exposure to a poten-
tially disabling source, he must file a claim within one year of 
that actual notice for all injuries which may arise from this 
exposure." 
This certainly would provide an excellent negative incentive to file 
claims on actual notice of exposure. If there is good reason for such 
advance filing, it is better to make it mandatory rather than per-
missive, but the latter type of incentive could be provided by chang-
ing the proviso to read: "a claim may be filed upon actual notice of 
exposure to a potentially disabling source." In either case, the 
basic question is whether or not the difficulties raised by advance 
filing provisions are outweighed by the advantages achieved. 
Problems of proof undoubtedly will arise. The employee may 
have received exposures of which he was not aware, in addition to 
that of which he had notice. Often it will be difficult, if not im-
possible, to prove which exposure or exposures caused the condi-
tion. In addition, the spectre of numerous frivolous and unjustified 
claims by employees arises. Unless some exposure level line is drawn, 
the well-advised employee will file an advance claim whenever he 
has the slightest reason to suspect an exposure has occurred. By 
barring any claim arising from a known exposure unless notice is 
filed, the statutory provisions here suggested are in the nature of 
a penalty. Even if the positive inducement provision were used, 
there would still be every reason to file a claim for every exposure, 
no matter how small, because some inducement such as keeping 
open all claims once filed undoubtedly would be used. In addition, 
this type of provision keeps the period open indefinitely, a highly 
questionable policy. Although this point will be discussed in more 
detail below in relation to the cutoff period, 185 it should be pointed 
out here that keeping the period so open largely removes the defin-
iteness sought to be attained by imposing the cutoff period in the 
first place. 
In spite of these difficulties, however, a very good reason for 
advance filing relating to proof problems does exist. There pro-
bably is little reason for immediate notice of exposure from the 
standpoint of medical treatment. Nevertheless, in proving whether 
or not exposure occurred and, if so, in what amounts, it may be very 
important to know immediately of any alleged accident so that it 
185 See discussion in text accompanying notes 136-44 infra. 
288 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
can be reconstructed and the dosimetry determined as accurately 
as possible.136 A related advantage of immediate notice of exposure 
is that some latent diseases which can arise from exposure will not 
do so short of a minimum latency period.137 If we are to use existing 
rules of proving causal connection between the irradiation and the 
disease in question, advantage should be taken of existing scientific 
knowledge. An employer should not be charged for diseases which 
scientists know cannot have resulted from the exposure in question. 
For these reasons it is essential that advance filing of notice of known 
exposures be required. 
A solution does exist for one of the most serious disadvantages 
of advance filing, i.e., that every minute exposure will be filed and 
this will become an administrative nuisance. On the basis of present 
scientific knowledge, and so long as the existing proof of causation 
rules are used, a very good case can be made for limiting recovery 
for occupation exposures to those in which the acute dose is larger 
than 35 r, because below that level the increased chance of having 
the disease is so small as to be de minimis.138 Even the total chance 
136 This is particularly true in the case of criticality excursions where a mock-up of 
the "incident" might be required or where blood sodium-24 determinations are useful 
in calculating neutron exposure. See Union Carbide Nuclear Company Report Y-1234, 
Accidental Radiation Excursion at the Y-12 plant, Final Report 5-23 (1958). See also 
Hurst & Ritchie, Radiation Accidents: Dosimetric Aspects of Neutron and Gamma-Ray 
Exposures, Part A 1-16, 19-22 (Oak Ridge Nat'l Lab. 2748) (1959). 
137 This will allow exclusion of certain cases in which the onset of the disease is 
before the minimum latent period. For the leukemias the latent period is from two to 
fifteen years with the peak incidence occurring between the fourth and seventh years. 
There is no documented evidence of an increased number of cases of leukemia in the first 
fifteen months after exposure in any of the series of studies of exposed individuals. See 
National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Effects of Ionizing Radiation on 
the Human Hemapactic System 5-7 (Publication 875) (1961). See also U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. 
REc., 17th Sess., Supp. No. 16, 145-47 (A/5216) (1962). 
138 If it is assumed (1) that radiation has a linear dose-effect relationship with regard 
to leukemogenesis down to zero dose, (2) that the average natural incidence of leukemia 
is about 7 per 100,000 population at risk per year, and (3) that there is a probability of 
radiation-induced leukemia of bone marrow origin of two cases per rad per 1,000,000 
population at risk per year, 35 rads will give the exposed individual a probability of 
developing leukemia from a given exposure nearly equal to his probability of developing 
it from natural causes (35 X 2 or 70 out of one million or 7 out of one hundred thousand). 
This assumes that radiation induces all varieties of leukemia, that radiation leukemogenesis 
is not sex, age, or dose-rate dependent and that the radiation has a lifetime rather than 
a limited (two to fifteen years) leukemogenic effect. It further assumes that the natural 
incidence of all leukemias does not vary with age or sex and that the probability of 
radiation-induced leukemia is not reduced because of deaths from other causes than 
leukemia. All of these are conservative assumptions in favor of the potential victim. See 
Lewis, Leukemia and Ionizing Radiation, 125 SCIENCE 965-72 (1957). For an opposing 
view, see Brues, Critique of the Linear Theory of Carcinogenesis, 128 SCIENCE 693-99 
(1958). See general discussion of scientific facts and their application to the contingent 
injury fund idea in Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach 
to Injury Litigation, 59 Mrca. L. REv. 259 (1960). 
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of contracting the disease, including natural incidence possibilities, 
is very small in such cases. If this floor is accepted most of the 
administrative nuisance difficulty inherent in an advance filing 
requirement is obviated. 
If, as suggested earlier by one of the present writers, 139 a con-
tingent injury fund alternative were accepted as a solution to the 
proof of causal connection problem, then advance filing would be · 
required in every case and an immediate determination would be 
made of the amount of exposure and the increased chances of the 
disease caused by the particular source of radiation. The recom-
mendations made here, however, are for changes which should be 
made in existing rules in which causation must be proved by the 
claimant to have "more probably than not" been connected with 
defendant's source. 
Whether or not advance filing as outlined above is required, 
so long as the filing period is based upon the employee's knowledge 
of exposure and work connection, as it should be, provision must be 
made for terminating the employee's filing right at some period 
after the notice. In any event, there is no need for a long period be-
cause by hypothesis the employee has knowledge of the vital facts. 
Many statutes allow one year, which certainly is long enough if 
our recommendations are accepted. A strong case could be made, 
however, for making it considerably shorter, such as six or even 
three months. The shorter period would better meet the needs for 
proof of the fact and level of exposure, as suggested above. 
2. Over-All Cutoff Dates 
A claim-filing requirement which is based on the employee's 
reasonable knowledge of his physical condition would of itself al-
low the employee to file at any time the condition developed. This 
would be so regardless of the length of time which may have elapsed 
from the exposure to the manifestation of the condition or from the 
termination of employment with the employer in whose service the 
injurious exposure occurred. Such a provision potentially extends 
the employer's liability to the life of the employee, assuming, of 
course, that compensation of some sort140 is still available under the 
statute. Problems of proof are obvious difficulties in such a situation 
and the employer may thus be forced to keep extensive records on 
present and past employees. Considerations of this nature have 
130 Ibid. 
140 For example, medical and hospital expenses. 
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prompted many states to enact the provisions, reviewed above,141 
which terminate the right to make a claim after a certain period 
regardless of what may be the terms of the claim-filing provisions. 
Other legislatures have enacted no such legislation, presumably 
reasoning that if the condition is related to employment and can be 
so proved, it ought to be compensable, since it is no fault of the 
- employee that the condition is delayed.142 
There is merit in both views. Cutoff dates provide, in effect, 
an irrebuttable presumption that the condition is not causally 
related to employment. The employer is thus given some guarantee 
that beyond a set date a particular employee cannot pursue any 
claim. The difficulty is, of course, that we know that a given condi-
tion may indeed be related to employment in spite of the legislative 
presumption that it is not. In short, the cutoff period provides a 
balancing of interests and, as such, is not satisfactory in every in-
stance. It is the view of the present writers that if such a period is 
provided, it should be carefully shaped to deal fairly with the diffi-
culties inherent in the nature of radiation-induced conditions. 
These difficulties will now be examined. 
The Date From Which the Period Runs. The traditional cut-
off periods have required that either the condition emerge or that 
a claim be filed within a certain time from either the date of last ex-
posure in employment or from the last day of the employment in 
which the injurious exposure was suffered.148 There have been few 
deviations from this pattern-none of which bears review at this 
point.144 Of the generally used dates, that of the last day of employ-
ment provides the most certainty. However, exposure to an actually 
or potentially injurious source may well cease long before em-
ployment with that employer ends. Undoubtedly this is the reason 
that the majority of states have chosen the date of the last injurious 
exposure.145 Although the facts of any given case may vary, gener-
ally this date will be much more uncertain than the date of last 
employment. In cases of exposure to radiation, the uncertainty 
will probably be even greater. For that reason it is recommended 
that the statute utilize the last day of possible exposure to a poten-
tially injurious source. Use of this date would avoid holding the 
141 See discussion in text accompanying notes 97-113 supra. 
142 This is the view apparently advanced in 2 Larson §§ 78.42(b)·42(c) and to a lesser 
degree in SCHNEIDER § 2358. However, neither commentator distinguishes clearly between 
the claim filing requirements and the cutoff type of provision. 
143 See discussion in text accompanying notes 97-113 supra and Appendix A. 
144 These are discussed in the text accompanying notes 110-14 supra. 
145 See Appendix A. 
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period open from the possibly long removed termination of em-
ployment. At the same time, it would give the employee the benefit 
of keeping the period open from the last possibility of injurious ex-
posure. It should be noted that such a provision would have no 
effect on the employee's burden of proving causation. The proof 
section of the statute would exist separately from this section and 
its requirements would have to met separately. The only effect of 
the suggested provision would be to allow the cutoff provision to 
run from the date of exposure most favorable to the employee re-
gardless of which exposure or exposures may be proved to have 
caused the condition. At the same time it would not postpone start-
ing the period until a time often unrelated to the potential injury, 
i.e., the last date of employment. 
Effect of the Period. The general effect of the cutoff period is, 
of course, to bar all claims which develop after a certain date. How-
ever, three variations within this general pattern may be provided. 
First, the period may be used to bar only those claims, including 
potential claims, which have not been filed. This effect presumes 
the utilization of some system of recording potential claims, the 
desirability of which was discussed above.146 Even if such a system is 
employed, it is suggested that the cutoff provisions should work 
against potential claims also, requiring not only that a filing of the 
claim but also that the condition itself develop within the given 
period. To provide otherwise would be to sacrifice a great deal of 
the certainty sought to be achieved by the cutoff. Thus, the second 
alternative would be to require that the condition emerge within 
the given period and that compensation be available only for that 
period. An employee could receive compensation only for that 
portion of his condition which occurred before the cutoff date. A 
third alternative would be to block compensation for conditions 
emerging after the cutoff date, but to allow full compensation for 
conditions emerging before the date even though they continued 
beyond it. Of the last two possibilities, the third is that which has 
received greatest support in the statutes and case law.147 It is sug-
gested, therefore, that this approach be incorporated in the radia-
tion sections of the workmen's compensation acts. 
Length of the Period. Existing statutes employ cutoff periods 
HO See discussion in text accompanying notes 133-35 supra. 
147 Unfortunately, the subject has not been explored by the commentators and writers. 
However, most statutes are framed on the lines of the New Jersey statute which is dis-
cussed in the text accompanying note 99 supra. Such provisions explicitly require only 
that a claim be filed. 
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which vary from 120 days to twenty-five years.148 In view of the fact 
that manifestation of many radiation-induced conditions may be 
long delayed, a fairly long period, from twenty-five to thirty years, 
should be provided. Such a period would allow coverage of most 
radiation-induced conditions, while at the same time providing 
the desired cutoff. 
C. Employer Knowledge of Exposure and the Statute of 
Limitations 
Among the essentially novel problems raised by radiation ex-
posure is that of the employer's knowledge of exposure suffered 
by the employee. The traditionally conceived compensable con-
ditions are accidental injuries and occupational diseases of which, 
by their very nature, the employee is likely to have first notice. Of 
course, numerous radiation-induced conditions will fit this pattern. 
If they do, there is no reason to treat them as different from "ordi-
nary" accidental injuries or occupational diseases. However, in 
numerous circumstances exposure to an actually or potentially 
disabling source of radiation may occur and the employee would 
not necessarily have knowledge of this exposure. The employer, on 
the other hand, will probably know of the exposure, at least if he 
follows good radiation safety procedures. The obvious problem is 
whether or not to require that the employer report this exposure. 
Although this question is not directly related to the statute of limi-
tations provisions, the effect of the employer's failure to report, 
should such a duty be imposed, may be so related. Therefore, the 
problem merits full consideration here. 
Basis for the Requirement. If the employer is required to re-
port even nondisabling exposures, there is a strong possibility of 
inducing unreasoned fear in the employee, with a resulting filing 
of frivolous claims, or possibly actual disablement caused solely by 
psychological reactions. Nonetheless, it is suggested that a report of 
exposure to radiation above certain prescribed minimum safety 
levels should be required. In the first place, the exposure may be of 
such an extent as immediately to entitle the employee to compensa-
tion.149 An employer who knows of the exposure knows that the 
employee is entitled to compensation. In fairness, he should be re-
quired to communicate this information to the employee. Similarly, 
if an employee is allowed or required to file a claim for potential 
148 See Appendix A. 
149 For example, retraining expenses. See ATOMS AND THE LAw 829-30. 
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injuries,1110 employer knowledge of the exposure is knowledge that 
the employee could file a claim. This information, too, ought to be 
given to the employee. The serious difficulty arises when an em-
ployee suffers relatively slight overexposures which do not give 
rise to an immediately compensable condition or do not allow the 
employee to file a claim immediately. Such exposure to poten-
tially disabling radiation places the employee in a dangerous posi-
tion. If he is unaware of the exposure suffered, he may unwittingly 
subject himself to further exposure in subsequent employment or 
during medical treatment, which would be extremely hazardous in 
view of the prior exposure. Hence, when exposure exceeds certain 
levels, the employer should be required to report it. 
Relation to the Statute of Limitations. To be fully effective, 
a provision requiring reporting of exposure must be implemented 
by enforcement provisions. Two possibilities may be utilized. An 
obvious one would be to provide a monetary fine. An alternative, 
however, would be a provision which in some manner suspended 
the statute of limitations. The use of such a scheme should depend 
upon the type of limitation provisions in effect. If the reasonable 
knowledge standard is employed, there is no reason to suspend this 
section unless it is determined that the employer should be penal-
ized for his failure to report. The reason for this conclusion is 
apparent. The reasonable knowledge system requires that the em-
ployee file only when he has, or should have, knowledge. The em-
ployer's failure to communicate this knowledge to the employee, 
although it may prejudice him insofar as subsequent exposures are 
concerned, 151 will not prejudice him insofar as the claim-filing re-
quirements are concerned. The cutoff section of the statute, how-
ever, presents a different problem. If the exposure suffered gives 
rise to a compensable condition or if potential claims are allowed 
and they are not affected by the cutoff period provision, then the 
employer's failure to give notice clearly prejudices the employee 
whose right to compensation will be terminated if no claim is filed 
within the period. Clearly the employer ought not to be allowed to 
so benefit from his willful or negligent failure to fulfill his legal 
duty; hence, under these circumstances, the cutoff period ought to 
be suspended. Of course, if potential claims are allowed but the 
cutoff operates on them, there is no need to suspend the statute of 
150 See discussion in text accompanying notes 133-35 supra. 
151 If the employee does in fact suffer because of the employer's negligent or willful 
failure to give notice, a separate provision for a monetary fine or perhaps even allowing 
an action at law might well be in order. 
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limitations since a filing for a condition which developed after the 
period would be irrelevant. 
The above suggestions would put the employee in the position 
he would have been in had the employer fulfilled his legal duty. 
The employee gains nothing other than the presumption that he 
would have filed a claim had he been given the relevant informa-
tion. Any further suspension of the statutory period would be, in 
effect, a penalty to the employer and an unjustified windfall to the 
employee. Although a monetary fine might be appropriate for an 
employer who disregards the statute, there seems no reason to 
benefit the employee unnecessarily in these cases. 
Relevant Existing Statutory Provisions. Two types of existing 
statutory provisions are relevant to this problem. First are the long 
existent provisions requiring, generally, that the employer report to 
the workmen's compensation agency all accidental injuries and 
sometimes occupational diseases of which he has actual knowledge 
or is given notice by the employee.152 The purpose of these pro-
visions seems to be to assure that the employer is following through 
on the employee's right to compensation. It is to be emphasized 
that these provisions require that the employer actually know that 
the employee has, or claims to have, suffered a disabling or com-
pensable condition. The employer's knowledge that an event has 
occurred which could give rise to such a condition is not sufficient 
to necessitate a report to the agency.153 
These provisions are relevant here because five states provide 
that the statute of limitations will, in some manner, be suspended 
until the employer files his report.154 In most cases such a provision 
is an outright gift to the employee, for he too has knowledge of his 
condition. The fact that the employer has or has not filed his report 
will not affect that knowledge in any way. Hence, suspension of the 
statute of limitations in these circumstances seems to be a question-
able remedy. Most states provide only a nominal monetary fine,155 
while a few couple this with an alternative jail sentence.156 
The applicability of these provisions to radiation problems is 
somewhat unclear. Of course, if the radiation-induced condition is 
similar to an "ordinary" injury, the provisions will operate in the 
152 See Appendix B. 
153 The statutory language makes this point clear; two cases underscore it. See Sanchez 
v. Bemadilli County, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909 (1953); Paridee v. Great A&: P Tea Co., 
278 Mich. 191, 270 N.W. 263 (1936). 
154 See Appendix B. 
ms Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
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ordinary manner. However, the question arises whether or not 
such statutes could be read to require that the employer report 
every slight overexposure of which he has knowledge. First, it is 
to be noted that no statute specifically embodies the notion of re-
port of such exposures to a potentially disabling source. Therefore, 
their applicability to radiation-induced conditions depends on (I) 
the phrasing of the present statutes and (2) the coverage provided 
for radiation-induced conditions. If the exposure itself may be 
deemed to give rise to a compensable condition,1117 then notice to 
the agency from the employer probably could be required under 
some existing statutes.158 However, the phrasing of other statutes 
would block coverage of this sort of condition even if it were 
deemed compensable.m 
It is therefore apparent that under some circumstances the 
employer notice provisions may be applicable to radiation-induced 
conditions. Such a conclusion is, however, only half a step. The 
most important point is that it is equally apparent that such pro-
visions simply were not designed to deal with relatively small ex-
posures to a potentially disabling radiation source. If mere exposure 
does not give rise to a compensable condition, none of the statutes 
would require reporting. But if it is a compensable condition, it 
may differ from "ordinary" injuries in that often only the employer 
will know of it. Notice to the employee should be required and the 
statute of limitations should be suspended until such notice is 
given. Heretofore, those provisions lifting the statute have provided 
a rather harsh and unnecessary penalty. In these circumstances, 
they would only put the employee in the position in which he 
would have been had the employer fulfilled his legal duty. 
The second type of provision relevant to this question is that 
sometimes included in the recently enacted radiation "industry 
safety" laws.100 Typical form of the notice requirements included 
therein is section S(b) of the Model Act for State Radiation Con-
trol,161 which provides: 
157 For example, it may entitle the employee to retraining expenses. 
158 E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-27 (1959) ('compensable accidental injuries"); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 102.37 (1957) ("death or disability'). 
159 E.g., R.I. GEN. LA.ws ANN. § 28-32-1 (1956) requires report of personal injury only 
if fatal, incapacitating for three days, or requiring medical assistance. 
100 See CCH ATOM. ENERGY L. REP. at 23021-23. 
101 State Radiation Control Act, Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legisla-
tion-Program for 1961. Somewhat different language from an earlier version of the Model 
Act has been incorporated into a number of existing statutes. See CCH ATOM. ENERGY 
L. REP. 1J 170311. 
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"The (agencies or cite appropriate agency) shall require 
each person who possesses or uses a source of ionizing radiation 
to maintain appropriate records showing the radiation ex-
posure of all individuals for whom personnel monitoring is 
required by rules and regulations of the (agencies or agency). 
Copies of these records ... shall be submitted to the (agencies 
or agency) on request. Any person possessing or using a source 
of ionizing radiation shall furnish to each employee for whom 
personnel monitoring is required a copy of such employee's 
personal exposure record annually, at any time such employee 
has received excessive exposure, and upon termination of em-
ployment. "162 
Penalties provided for violation of the section are monetary. 
These provisions are not a part of the workmen's compensation 
system of the respective states. Nevertheless, their relation to that 
system is apparent. Unless otherwise provided, radiation exposure 
records could be used by the employee as evidence to support a 
claim for compensation as well as for his personal well-being. It is 
suggested that states employing such provisions ought to consider 
the effect of employer failure to give notice upon the statute of 
limitations section of the workmen's compensation act. One sug-
gestion is to create a conclusive presumption of causal connection 
if notice intentionally is not given; if unintentionally, perhaps it 
would be enough to toll filing requirements. 
Summary. The present workmen's compensation systems have 
not given adequate consideration to the problem of employer 
knowledge of exposure of an employee. Existing statutes suspend-
ing the statute of limitations are of dubious wisdom as presently 
conceived and are wholly inadequate to deal with the problem 
presented by exposure to radiation. Nonetheless, the concept of 
requiring the employer to give notice or make a report is not new. 
The present systems provide a structure upon which adequate pro-
visions can be framed. The industrial safety laws provisions relat-
ing to the use of radiation are of themselves adequate in their re-
quirements of notice to the employee, but their relation to the 
workmen's compensation acts must be clarified by legislative action. 
D. Specific Injuries and the Statute of Limitations 
Probably the vast majority of radiation-induced conditions 
will create disability as traditionally conceived. However, some 
162 State Radiation Control Act § 16. 
1963] RADIATION INJURIES 297 
such conditions will be of a unique character which may itself 
create problems with the statute of limitations section of the act. 
It may be seriously questioned whether the sundry injuries exam-
ined at this point should even be compensable. However, that 
question is not within the scope of this inquiry,168 and the dis-
cussion proceeds on the assumption that coverage is provided. The 
problem examined is whether, assuming coverage, special statute 
of limitations provisions are necessary or desirable for the particular 
in juries discussed. 
Occupational Diseases Requiring Retraining. This possibly 
compensable condition has been discussed extensively in the fore-
going text and it will therefore be necessary only to recall the main 
points of that discussion. If the condition is deemed compensable, 
exposure to certain prescribed levels of radiation may entitle the 
employee to retraining for an occupation which does not involve 
further risk of exposure. The exposure itself should be defined as 
a "compensable condition" for purposes of retraining and there-
fore no special statute of limitation provision would be required 
because knowledge of exposure would be equivalent to knowledge 
of a compensable condition. 
Shortened Life Span. The same reasoning as was applicable to 
retraining rights should be applicable to shortened life span. Upon 
a certain exposure, the employee's life span is predictably reduced. 
The coverage section should prescribe the levels of exposure and 
the damages to be awarded. If it is to be treated as a compensable 
disability, there would again be no need of any special statutory 
limitations provisions other than the regular ones since the con-
dition is suffered on exposure. 
Increased Susceptibility to Disease. The same approach might 
be taken here because an employee's increased susceptibility theo-
retically is predictable upon a given exposure. However, in this 
instance physical manifestations will occur later if the employee has 
actually suffered the injury. Therefore it is arguable that there 
should be some delay in order to determine whether or not the 
employee has indeed been injured and, if so, the extent of that 
injury. On the other hand, probably in this limited field a pro-
vision for potential injury claims should be adopted. The reason-
ably prudent man standard is not readily applicable since it may 
be uncertain when a person becomes reasonably aware that he 
suffers from increased susceptibility. Hence, it is suggested that 
168 See general discussion in ATOMS AND THE LAw 199-360. 
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filing of a claim should be required upon actual notice of exposure 
or upon actual knowledge of the condition, whichever first occurs. 
Recovery of damages, however, should be deferred until there is 
some physical manifestation. 
The incorporation of an actual knowledge provision may be 
deemed objectionable by some. Its use is suggested because of the 
difficulty of applying the reasonable standards to such injuries. In 
most cases it will be the employer's failure to report exposure which 
will necessitate reliance on another date. There seems good cause 
not to put the employee at a disadvantage because of the employer's 
-failure. 
Damage to Offspring. Once more there is statistical probability 
but there is even more reason to deny recovery until an affected 
offspring is born, for only then will the injury definitely be ascer-
tainable. A provision similar to that employed for increased sus-
ceptibility should be employed but the reasonable standard should 
be used here. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the foregoing review and discussion it is clear that existing 
statutory systems are inadequate to cope with many difficulties 
which may be raised by radiation-induced conditions. The inade-
quacy may be of two types. First, some statutes are inadequate as 
applied to even "ordinary" conditions. They will necessarily be 
inadequate to deal with radiation-induced conditions. What is 
needed is a general reform of the statute in the particular area of 
difficulty. A good example of this would be the adoption of area-
sonably-prudent-man knowledge standard applicable to all claim 
filing requirements. There is no reason why this standard should 
be applied only to radiation-induced conditions. Second, there 
are particular problems of inadequacy caused by the nature of 
radiation injuries. The key to dealing with these is to recognize the 
problems and to enact special provisions to cope with them. A hit-
or-miss treatment of radiation-induced conditions simply because 
they are "different" makes no sense at all.164 In most cases, these 
conditions are not so different as to require exceptional treatment, 
and when they are, such treatment can be provided. Hence, we 
recommend the following: 
164 The Virginia provision removing all requirements for the filing of claims for 
radiation-induced occupational disease is an example of an amendment which has little, 
if any, reasonable basis. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 65-49 (Supp. 1962). 
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1. Maintenance of the present statute of limitation sections to 
apply to radiation-induced conditions; 
2. Elimination of the "accidental injury"-"occupational dis-
ease" dichotomy and provision that all work-connected disabilities 
("injuries") be compensable; 
3. Provision that all claim filing (with one or two minor excep-
tions) be subject to a reasonable knowledge standard; 
4. Elimination, or revamping along the lines discussed above, 
of cutoff provisions for radiation-induced conditions; 
5. Special provisions for "unique" radiation-induced condi-
tions along the lines suggested. 
Although these recommendations will not solve all the problems 
which may arise, they will go a good distance in providing an 
adequate basis upon which the agencies and courts may intelli-
gently proceed. 
APPENDIX A 
EXISTING STATUTE OF LIMITATION PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO RADIATION-INDUCED CONDITIONS 
Explanation: 
1. "Regular or special": "R" indicates that radiation-induced conditions arc covered under the provisions for all conditions. "S" indicates special coverage for "latent" 
and for radiation-induced conditions. 
2. "T": indicates a split coverage-in general, rc_gular coverage for filing requirements and special coverage for "cutoff" dates. 
3, "X": indicates a lack of a provision or inapplicability of the category to the particular state law involved. 




































Only "occupational pneumonoconiosis" covered. 
tit. 26, H 313(1)-313(16) (1958) 
2 yrs, from knowledge, None 
§ 43-3-41 (9) (Supp. 1959) 
60 days from disablement. 
§ 23-1224(2) (1956) 
2 yrs, from last injurious 
exposure. § 81-1318 (1960) 
1 yr. from knowledge. 
§ 5412 (1953); § 5405 
(1953) 
3 yrs. from disability. § 81· 
18-11 (Supp. 1961) 
1 yr, from manifestation 
of symptom, § 31-294 
(Supp. 1961) 
1 yr, from knowledge. tit, 
19, § 2361 (c) (Supp. 
1960) 
2 yrs. from "injury," 
§ 440,151 (1952); § 440.19 
(Supp, 1961) 
1 yr, from "accident" 
(which is read here as 
"injury"). § 114-810; 
§ 114-305 (1956). Sec 52 
S.E.2d 325 (1949). 
Total disability within 
120 days from last day 
of employment, § 23-1107 
(2) (1956) 
Disablement within 1 
yr. of last injurious ex-




(Claim filed) 5 yrs, from 
last exposure in employ-
ment. tit. 19, § 2361 (c) 
(Supp. 1960) 
None 
Disablement within 1 yr. 















"Accident'' or "Injµry" 
and Time Period 
Accidcnt-1 yr. tit. 26, 
§ 296 (1958) 
Same as for occupational 
disease, § 43-3-41(9) 
(Supp, 1959) 
Injury-I yr. § 23-1061 
(1956) 
Injury-60 days, ["No-
tice" to commission.] § 81· 
1317 (1960) 
Accident-1 yr. H 5405, 
5411 (1953) 
Injury-IO days. § 81·13·5 
(1953) 
Accident-I yr, § 31-294 
(Supp, 1961) 
Accidcnt-2 yrs, tit, 19, 
§ 2361(a) (Supp. 1960) 
lnjury-2 yrs. § 440. 19 
(Supp. 1961) 







§ 81-1318 (1960) 
Same 
Accidcnt-5 yrs. 












































2 yrs. from knowledge. 
§ 97-52, Act 11' (1961) 
1 yr. from disability and 
knowledge. § 72·1228 
(Supp. 1961) 
1 yr. from disablement [R]. 
tit. 48, § 172.41 (c) (Supp. 
1961) 
2 yrs. from disablement 
[R]. I 40-222S (Supp. 
1962) 
90 days from knowledge. 
I 8SA.12 (Supp. 1962) 
3 yrs. from last day of 
employment. I 44·Sa17 
(Supp. 1961) 
1 yr. after last exposure or 
after knowledge-whichever 
last occurs. I 342,316 
(1962) 
4 mos. of contraction or 
manifestation [to employ-
er], § 23:1031,l (D) 
(Supp. 1962) 
1 yr. from incapacity or 
knowledge-whichever lat• 
er. ch. 31, I 63 (19S4) 
ch. 31, § 70-A (Supp. 
1962) 
l yr. of disability. art. 
101, I 26 (19S7) 
6 mos. from "injury," ch. 
1'2, I 41 (19'7 J 




S yrs. from I ast exposure 
(emergence) [SJ. tit. 48, 
§ 172.36(£) (Supp. 1961) 
Disablement within 2 yrs. 
of knowledge [SJ. I 40• 
220,Ce) (Supp. 1962) 
Condition must emerge 
2 yrs. from last exposure. 
§ ssA.12 (Supp. 1962) 
Disablement within 1 yr. 
from last exposure,i § 44-
5a01 (Supp, 1961) No 
claim 3 yrs. after event. 




Disablement within l yr. 
after last injurious ex• 
















Same as for occupational disease, I 97•52 (1961) 
Accident-1 yr. I 72-402 
(1949) 
.Accident-6 mos. tit. 48, 
§ 161 (1950) 
Knowledgc-2 yrs, I 40• 
1224 (Supp. 1962) 
Injury-2 yrs, I 85,26 
(1949) 
.Accident-180 days [to em• 
ployed. § 44-S20a (Supp. 
1961) 
Accident-1 yr. I 342,185 
(1962) 
.Accident-I yr.; if latent, 
two yrs. from accident. 
I 23:1209 (1950) 
Accident-I yr. (mar be 
extended to 2 irs. if ' mis-
take of fact' ) • ch. 31, 
I 33 (Supp. 1962) 
Accident----60 days unless 
"sufficient cause.' art. 101, 
I 39 (1962) 
Same as for occupational 
disease, ch. 1'2 §§ 1(7.A), 
41 (1957) 
Injury-6 mos. This may 
be extended to 3 yrs. if 
emplorer is ~iven notice 
of accident within 3 mos. 
and condition is latent. 















































APPENDIX A (Continued) 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASB PROVISiONS 
Filing 
6 yrs. from disablement. 
§ 176.66(1) (1945); 
§ 176.151(1) (Supp. 
1961); § 176.011(16) 
(Supp. 1961) 
Cutoff 
Disease must have been 
"contracted" within 12 
mos. of disablement. 
§ 176.66(3) (Supp. 
1961) 
No provision for occupational disease 
1 yr. from knowledge. 
§ 287.063(6) (1925) 
30 days from notice to 
employer; notice due 30 
days from knowledge. § 92· 
1312, § 92-1313 (Supp. 
1961) 
6 mos. from "injury." 
§ 48-133 (1943) 
4 mos. after disability [R]. 
§ 617,330 (1961) 
On!)' notice to employer 
required 90 days from first 
date of treatment by li-
censed physician. §§ 281: 
16-17 (Supp. 1961) 
2 yrs. after exposure ceases 
or 1 yr. after knowledge--
whichever lattr. I 34:15•34 
(1959) 
60 days from disablement. 
§ 59·11·30(b) (1953) 
None 
Total disability within 
120 days of last day of 
employment; may be ex-
tended to 1 yr. for "good 
cause." §§ 92-1311 (2) , 
92-1313 (Supp. 1961) 
1 yr. from "accident." 
[Note Nebraska's liberal 
construction reads "acci-
dent" as "injury."] 
§ 48-137 (1943) 
Disease must have been 
contracted in Nevada 
within 4 yrs. of dis-
ability [SJ. § 617.440 
(1961) 
None 
5 yrs. from last exrsure. 
§ 34:15-34 (1959 
Disablement within 120 
days of last day of em-














ACCIDENT OR INJURY PROVISIONS 
"Accident" or "Inj~" 
and Time Period 
Accident-6 yrs. § 176.151 
(1) (Supp. 1961) 
Injury-30 days (to R). 
§ 6998-113 (1942) 
Injury-I yr. § 287 .430 
(1949) 







Same as for occupational disease. §§ 48-133,·137 (1943) 
Accident-90 days. "Suf-
ficient reason" may excuse. 
§§ 616.500(1), 61G.500(6) 
(a) (1961) 
Only notice to employer 90 
days after accident. § 281: 
16 (Supp. 1961) 
Accident-2 yrs. § 34:15-H 
(1959) 
Notice required to cm1>loy-
er 60 days from auiiltnt. 
§ 59-10-13.4(A) (1953). 
Claim re<juired 1 yr. after 
employer's failure to pay 


















































90 days from disablement 
& knowledge, I 28 
1 yr. from disability. § 97• 
58 (1958) 
60 days from "injury." 
§ 65-05-01; § 65-01-02(8) 
(1960) 
2 yrs. from disabili!Y, or 6 
mos. from diagnosis1 or 6 
mos. from knowleage of 
diagnosis (R]. § 4123.85 
(Supp. 1962) 
1 yr. after manifestation 
to one learned in medicine 
or last hazardous exposure.• 
tit. as, § 43 (Supp. 1962) 
180 days from date B was 
disabled or information 
from physician, I 656,807 
(1961) 
16 mos, from disability. 
tit. 77, § 1415 (Supp. 
1961) 
24 mos. from disability 
but "latent" conditions 
have 2 yrs. from knowl-
edge or disability, which-
ever /a/er. § 28•34-4; I 28· 
35·57 (Supp. 1961) 
Not available 
1 yr. from disablement. 
§ 64,0805(21) (Supp. 
1960) 
1 yr. from incapacity. I 50• 
1108 (1952) 
6 mos. from manifestation 





Disability within 8 yrs. 
after last injurious ex-
posure [SJ. § 4123,68 
(Supp. 1962) 
None 
Claim must be flied 7 
yrs. from last exposure 




Disablement within 1 yr. 
from last injurious ex• 
l'OSUre, § 64,0807 ( 1) 
(Supp. 1960) 
None 
Statute purports to re• 
guire "incapacity" with-
in a certain period; in-
effective. art, 8306, § 25 














Accident-2 yrs., but same 
provision as for OCCUJ'a• 
tional disease available for 
certain "latent" conditions. 
I 2s 
Accident-2 yrs. I 97•24 
(1958) 
Injury-60 days. § 65-05-01 
(1960) 
Injury-2 yrs. I 4123.64 
(Supp. 1962) 
Injury-I yr. tit. 85, I 43 
(Supp. 1962) 
Accident-3 mos,, may be 
extended to 1 yr. on ' suf-
ficient cause." I 656,274 
(1961) 
Accidcnt-16 mos. tit. 77, 
§ 602 (Supp, 1962) 
Injury (strict)-2 y_rs. But 
for "latent" conditions 2 
yrs. from knowledge or 
disablement whichever la-
/er. § 28-35-n (Supp. 
1961) 
Not available 
Injury-I yr, I 64.0611 
(1939) 
Accident-I yr, § 50-1003 
(1952) 
Injury-6 mos, art. 8307, 

























Stat • .Ann. 
Wyoming 










APPENDIX A (Continued) 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE PROVISIONS 
Filing 
60 days from day upon 
which cause of action 
arises.§ 35·2-48(6) (1953) 
1 yr. from disablement 
( defined as medical apt,). 
tit. 21, § 1013; § 1004 
(Supp. 1961) 
None' § 65-49 (Supp. 
1962) 
1 yr. from date of notice 
from physician, § 51.28· 
,055 (1961) 
2 yrs. from last exposure, 
§ 2540 (1961) 
2 yrs. from injury or 
knowledge [RJ, § 102.12 
(1957) 
Cutoff 
Total disability within 
120 days from last day 
of event. § 35-2-13(2) 
(1953) 
Disablement within 3 
yrs, after last injurious 
exposure. tit. 21, § 1006 
None 
None 
Same § 2540 (1961) 
25 years from injury" [SJ. 
§ 102.17(4) (Supp. 1962) 










.hCCIDBNT OR INJURY PROVISIONS 
''Accident" or "Injury" 
and Time Period 
.Accident-3 yrs. § 35·1·99 
(1953) 
Injury (defined as medical 
apt,)~ mos. tit, 21, 
§ 656 (1959): § 1004 
(Supp. 1961) 
.Accident-1 yr. § 65-84 
(1950) 
Injury (strict)-1 yr. § 51· 
.28.050, § 51,08.100 
(1961) 
Injury-1 yr, § 2540 
(1961) 
Injury-2 yrs, [RJ § 102, 12 
(1957) 
Injury-1 yr. Latent in-
jury-I yr, after knowl-








25 yrs. from injury [SJ. 
§ 102.17(4) (Supp. 1962) 
None 
1 KAN. GEN. STAT, .ANN, § 44-5al7 (Supp. 1961) provides that the time limits "of this section" shall not be applicable to radiation-induced diseases, It is unclear whether 
"this section" means only § 45-5a17 or refers to the entire occupational disease act as a "section." Therefore, the a_pplicability of § 44-5a01 is uncertain. 
• The sole requirement of the statute seems to be notice to tlie employer. There is no clear indication of time limits on either a claim to the commission or emergence of the 
condition. This is also the conclusion of a Note, 15 LA. L. Rnv. 870 (1955). 
• The statute contains no indication whether or not one of the alternative periods may control the other. 
' See note 101 supra and accompanyinli text. 

































EXISTING STATUTES REQUIRING THE EMPLOYER To REPORT TIIE EMPLOYEE'S CoNDmON 
Notice Required 
(on Knowledge of-) 
All injuries. tit. 26, § 266 (1958) 
Injury or death, § 43-3-67(1) 
(Supp. 1959) 
None [Report may be required 
by commission. § 23·908 (1956)] 
Injury or death. § 81-1334 (Supp, 
1951) 
Injuries, fatal or otherwise. § 81-
6-1 (1953), Disease apparently 
covered. I 81-18·5 (1953) 
Injury resulting in incapacity, 
I 31-316 (Supp. 1962) 
Accident resulting in injury. tit. 
19, I 2313(a) (Supp. 1960) 
Injury or death. § 44036 (Supp, 
1961) 
All injuries, I 97-80 (Supp. 
1960) 
All injuries causing 1 day's 
absence. § 72-1001 (1947) Ap-
parently applicable to disease, 
§ 72·1202 (1947) 
All accidental injuries, tit, 48! 
§ 167 (1950), and occupationa 
disease, tit. 48, § 172,41 (Supp. 
1961) 
Injuries causing 1 day's absence, 
I 40-1517 (Supp. 1962) 
Permanent injury or incapacity 
lasting 7 days. § 86.11 (1949) 
PENAL1Y 
Monetary 
12 mos, or not more than $SOO, 
tit. 26, § 324 (1958) 
Not more than $500, I 43-3· 
67(S) (Supp. 1959) 
Not more than $100, I 81-1334 
(Supp. 19Sl) 
Not more than $100, § 81-14-26 
(1953) 
Not more than $2SO, § 31-288 
(Supp. 1962) 
$10 to $50, tit. 19, I 2313(c) 
(Supp. 1960) 
Not more than $100, § 44036 
(Supp. 1961) 
Not more than $100 or 90 
days. I 97-80 (Supp. 1960) 
Not more than $SOO, § 72-1001 
(1947) 
$10 to $500. tit. 48, § 172,55 
(Supp. 1961) 
Not less than $SO nor more than 
$500. § 40-1517 (Supp. 1962) 
$SO, § 86.12 (1949) 
Effect on Emrloyee 
Statute of limitations 
If employer has knowledge, s/1 
does not run until report liled. 
§ 43-3-67(6) (Supp. 1959) 
Other Provisions 
Report cannot be used in evi-
dence, I 43-3-67 (3) (Supp, 
1959) 
Report cannot be used in evi-
dence, § 81-1334 (Supp. 19Sl) 
Report is confidential. I 81-6-3 
(19H) 
Report is not evidence. tit. 19, 
§ 2313(d) (Supp. 1960) 






























(on Knowledge of-) 
Any accident, § 44•557 (Supp. 
1961), or occupational disease, 
§ 44-5a01 (Supp, 1961) 
Injury by accident causing Joss 
of 1 day's work or requiring 
services of physician. cli. 31, 
§ 44 (Supp, 1961) 
Accident causing disability of 
more than 3 days, art, 101, 
§ 38(b) (1937) 
All injuries. ch. 152, § 19 
(1957) . 
Injury. § 17,165 (1960) 
Death or serious injury, § 176-
,231 (Supp. 1962) 
Fatal injury or injury causing 
Joss of work time. § 6998-34 
(1942) 
Personal tnJ ury by accident, 
§ 287,380(1) (1949) 
Accident resulting in fatality or 
injury as required by commission. 
§ 92-808 (1947) 
Accident as required by commi-
sion. § 48-144 (1943) 
APPENDIX B (Continued) 
PENALTY 
Monetary 
Not more than $500, § 44-557 
(Supp. 1~61) 
Not more than $100. ch, 31, 
§ 44 (Supp. 1961) 
Not more than $SO. art. 101, 
§ 38(d) (Supp, 1962) 
Cost of proceedings caused by 
failure to report, ch, 152, § 19 
(1957) 
$SO, § 176.231 (Supp, 1962) 
Not more than $100. § 6998-34 
(1942) 
Not Jess than $SO nor more than 
$SOO or not less than 1 week 
nor more than 1 yr, or both, 
§ 287,380(4) (1949) 
Effect on Employee 
Statute of Limitations 
No limits run until employer 
files report if employee has given 
him notice, But no action can 
be brought 1 yr, after accident. 
§ 44-SS7 (Supp, 1961) 
S/1 will not run until filing by 
employer. art, 101, § 38(c) 
(Supp. 1962) 
Employer must have notice of 
injury within 3 mos, of accident. 
If so, s/1 will not run until he 
files. § 17.165 (1960) 
Other Provisions 
Reports cannot be used in evi-
dence against employer. § 44-557 
(Supp. 1961) 
(1) Not public. § 176,231 
(Supp, 1961) ; (2) Commission 
to notify employee, § 176,235 
(Supp. 1961) 
Report is confidential. § 287· 
,380(3) (1949) 


































Rev, Civ, Stat, 
Utah 
Code Ann, 
Injury. § 281:46 (1955) 
Occurrence of accident or occu-
rational disease. § 34: 15-96 
(1959) 
Compensable accidental injuries, 
§ 59-10-27 (1959) 
All injuries causine; loss of a 
day, a shift, or requ1ring medical 
treatment. § 110 (1946) 
Injury causing more than l day's 
absence. § 97·92(a) (1958) 
Accident resulting in injury, 
§ 65-01-07 (1960) 
All injuries or occupational 
diseases, § 4123,28 (Supp, 
1962) 
Accident resulting in injury, tit, 
BS, § 102 (1951) 
Accident and resulting injury, 
§ 656.422 (1961) 
Personal injury if fatal, incal'aci-
tating for 3 days, or requuing 
medical assistance, § 28-32-1 
(1956) 
Injury causing absence of more 
than 7 days, § 72-501 (Supp. 
1960) 
Accident resulting in personal 
injury, § 64.0505 (1939), Ap-
parently applicable to disease, 
§ 64.0802 (Supp, 1960) 
Accident resultin'f in injury 
causing absence o more than l 
day or notification by employee 
of disease, art, 8307, § 7 
(1956) 
Accident resulting in personal 
injury, § 35-1·97 (1953) 
Not more than $25. § 281:46 
(1955) 
$10 to $50, § 34-15-101 (1959) 
Not less than $25 nor more than 
$100. § 59-10-30 (1959) 
Not more than $500, 
Not less than $5 nor more than 
$25, § 97·92(e) (1958) 
Not more than $500, § 65-01·07 
(1960) 
Not more than $500, § 4123,99· 
(B) (Supp, 1962) 
Not more than $500, tit, 85, 
§ 102 (1951) 
$100. § 656.422 (1961) 
Not more than $50, § 28-32-2 
(1956) 
Not less than $5 nor more than 
$25, § 72-503 (1952) 
Not more than $25, § 64,9901 
(1939) 
Not more than $1000, art, 8307, 
§ 7 (1956) 
Not more than $500, § 35·1·97 
(1953) 
Repealed (1931) 
If employer has actual notice, 
s/1 lifted until 30 days after he 
Jiles. § 59·10-38 (1959) 
Reports not public and may not 
be used against employer al law. 
§ 34-15-99 (1959) 
Report is confidential,§ 97·92(b) 
(1958) 
Report is confidential, § 65-04-
15 (1960) 
Report cannot be used in evi• 
dence. § 28·32·4 (1956) 
























(on Knowledge of-) 
Injury causing 1 day's absence 
or necessitating medical attend-
ance. tit. 21, § 701 (19,9) 
All injuries, fatal or otherwise. 
§ 6'"115 (1962). Applicable to 
disease. § 6,-46 (1949) 
Injury. § 2,40 ( 1961) 
Death or disability. § 102,37 
(1957) 
Accident. § 27-107 (19'7) 
APPENDIX B (Continued) 
PENALTY 
Monetary 
Not more than $25, tit. 21, 
§ 702 (1959) 
Not more than $25, § 65-118 
(1949) 
Not more than $2500. § 2509 
(1961) 
Not less than $10 nor more than 
$100, § 102,35 (1957) 
Not more than $500. § 27-108 
(1957) 
Effect on Emv.loyee 
Statute of Limitations Other Provisions 
Report not available to public. 
D 65-119 (1949) 
Report cannot be used in evi-
dence, § 102.40 (1957) 
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